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ABSTRACT 
The last few years have seen the rise of the Internet as an everyday tool used by millions 
across the world. This unique medium poses numerous threats to the privacy of consumers, 
threats that many are oblivious to. The aim of this essay is to expose these problems and 
explain and critique current systems of protection. The initial issue addressed is whether 
industry initiatives are effective or whether some form of government intervention is required. 
The conclusion reached is that current self-regulatory measures leave large areas of privacy 
unprotected and are unlikely to amount to sufficient protection. 
Therefore the main purpose of this essay is to provide a comprehensive and feasible system 
that Governments could implement to safeguard privacy rights . Blocking the development of 
such a system is the ephemeral nature of the Internet with its lack of geographical borders. 
This reduces the ability of local laws to control privacy breaches. What is proposed is a 
solution via harmonisation, that is conforming laws relating to privacy and the Internet to a 
basic international standard. Complete harmonisation is admittedly unlikely but if a data 
restriction provision is enacted the agreement could still be effective. 
These international principles must be adequately enforced on a national level. The option 
advocated is based on the Privacy Commission model already established in New Zealand, 
and various other countries. This system would allow for industry involvement followed, in 
appropriate circumstances, by recourse to a privacy agency. In rare circumstances claims 
could be brought before the courts. The aim of this paper is to provide a practical and useful 
framework that will protect privacy on the Internet. 
The text of this paper (excluding contents page, footnotes, bibliography and annexures) 
comprises approximately 17,000 words. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In a recent case US Navy Petty Officer Timothy R McVeigh sent an e-mail to a 
volunteer regarding a toy drive for the families of sailors on the navy vessel Chicago. 
McVeigh sent the e-mail under his America Online ("AOL") screen name "boysrch". 
Using AOL' s member profile directory the volunteer learned that "boysrch" described 
himself as a member of the military whose marital status was gay. The volunteer 
forwarded this information to the navy, whose investigators called AOL to ask for 
"boysrch' s" real name. Despite the fact that the investigators did not have a warrant, or 
even identify themselves, an AOL representative identified McVeigh. The Navy then 
commenced an administrative discharge proceeding against McVeigh for "homosexual 
conduct".' 
This example clearly illustrates that while the Internet may be a "veritable milestone in 
human evolution"" it carries with it a potential cost - the sacrifice of privacy.3 
Approximately fifty million people currently use the Internet and the numbers are 
expected double by 2002.4 In survey after survey Internet users cite privacy as the most 
important issue facing the Internet today, and over three-quarters would go online more 
often if they felt their private information and communications were secure.5 It is 
therefore becoming increasingly important to develop a coherent, practical framework 
to protect privacy on the net. 
To adequately protect privacy, and determine instances of its breach, the first step must 
be to define what the term means. In cyberspace, as in the physical world, there is 
1 It was later held in the District Court of Columbia that the Navy"s actions were illegal under the 
Electronic Communications P1ivacy Act of 1986. This Act regulates the interception of private 
communications and access to, and disclosure of, stored electronic communications. McVeigh·s 
career, however, was effectively over and he agreed to retire in exchange for full benefits and 
payment of legal fees. McVeigh v Cohen 983 F Supp 215 (DDC 1998). This case was noted in 
E1ic J Si mod and Barak D Jolish "Controlling Chaos: the emerging law of privacy and speech in 
cyberspace" (1999) Stan Tech L Rev l. 
2 Robert C Vreeland and Bert J Dempsey "Toward a Truly Seamless Web: bringing order to law 
on the Internet" ( 1996) 88 (4) Law Library Journal 469, 470. 
3 A simple definition of the Internet is that of a global network that "links together a vast number 
of computers and computer networks by means of private and public links to provide computer 
users with access to phenomenal amounts of data worldwide". Clive Davies "Law and the 
Internet" [ I 995] 11 (4) Computer Law and Practice 106. 
4 Bryn Williams-Jones "Re-framing the Discussion: commercial genetic testing in Canada" (1999) 
7 Health L J 49. 
5 Graphic. Visualisation, & Usability Center (GVU), 8th WWW User Survey (October 1997) P 11 
at <http://www.gvu.gatech.edu/user_surveys/survey- l 997- J 0/>: Heather Green et al "A Little Net 
2 
confusion as to what privacy is and the term is often used to refer to different concepts.6 
This paper will review the area of privacy known as informational privacy. 7 While 
there is no consensus on the meaning of this term a useful definition that is widely 
accepted is "the right of individuals to determine when, how, and to what extent, they 
will share personal information about themselves with others".8 In general, personal 
information should only be used with an individual's consent. The purposes for which 
the information was obtained should determine its subsequent use and disclosure.9 
Personal information, as defined in section 2 of the New Zealand Privacy Act, is 
information about an identifiable individual. Some data may be considered more 
sensitive than others but not only "private" information is included within this concept. 
It might be that certain types of private information, such as medical details, should be 
subjected to a higher standard of protection. However, a minimum level must be 
provided to all information that is linked to an individual. Online privacy often deals 
with information that is personal without being private. '0 Even innocuous data can be 
compiled and matched to create a broader picture of individuals that is invasive of 
privacy. 11 For example address, phone number, income, property value and marital 
status have always been available for those willing to put time and effort into 
searching. 12 However, when this data is combined together and is easily accessible, 
privacy concerns are obviously raised. 
Clearly the Internet also provides other opportunities for pnvacy violations. For 
example, the sending of "spam" (unsolicited e-mail) may be viewed as an invasion of 
Privacy Please" (March 16. 1998) Business Weekly Online P3 at 
<http://www.businessweek.com/l 998/ l l/b3569 l 04.htm>. 
6 
Robert A Reilly "Conceptual Foundations of Privacy: looking backward before stepping 
forward" ( 1999) 6 Rich JL &Tech 6. 
7 
There has been doubt amongst some that data protection is even a privacy issue. Aldhouse 
convincingly refutes this proposition in "Data Protection, Privacy and the Media" (1999) 4(1) 
Communications Law 8. 10-11; John Angel also notes that data protection is a form of p1ivacy in 
" ew Rights to Privacy" (1998) 3(5) Communications Law I 69, 172. 
8 
Michael Power "Bill C-6: Federal legislation in the age of the internet" ( 1999) 26 Man LJ 235, 
238. Alan Westin has adopted a similar definition but includes groups and institutions within its 
ambit. Alan Westin "Privacy and Freedom" (Bodley Head, London, 1970) 7. 
9 
Charles Morgan ''Employer Monitoring of Employee Electronic Mail and Internet Use" 
(December, 1999) 44 McGill 849; Beth Givens. "Symposium on Internet Privacy: privacy 
expectations in a high tech world, opening presentation" (May, 2000) 16 Computer and High 
Tech LJ, 347. 
'° Karl D Belgum "Who Leads at Half-time: three conflicting visions of Internet privacy policy" 6 
Rich JL & Tech l. 
11 
Steven C Carlson and Ernest D Miller "Public Data and Personal Privacy" 16 Computer & 
High Tech LJ 83, 87. 
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the recipient's privacy m their home. Such violations are beyond the scope of this 
essay. 
As Part II explains the Internet poses unique challenges to this informational privacy . 
Most Internet analysts have focussed on the privacy concerns surrounding the 
controlling of storage, manipulation, and dissemination of information. While these 
aspects are clearly important controlling the collection of the information in the first 
place is often overlooked. This initial collection is emphasised in this paper because it 
is probably of even greater practical importance as it is most amenable to regulation. 
13 
This paper aims to determine whether the problems elucidated in Part II are best 
addressed by state-controlled regulation of the Internet by governmental or quasi-
governmental authorities, or through a system of self-regulation by the industry. At the 
forefront of this regulatory debate is the conflict between the United States (US) and the 
European Union (EU) in regards to the level of protection that personal information 
should attract. 14 
Part III therefore discusses the merits of a self-regulatory system of privacy protection. 
In doing so the organisations that collect personal information and therefore can control, 
restrict, or affect access, to that information are, and must be, the primary focus.
15 
Previously this would have meant concentrating on the government, because it was the 
only organisation that collected information about individuals on a large scale. 
16 
Although concerns about government infringement of privacy rights retains its 
importance, the focus of privacy concerns on the Internet is largely placed on the private 
sector. 17 Currently, the greatest sources of information on Internet users are private 
entities, such as clearinghouses and list brokers. 
18 
13 Dorothy Glancy "Symposium on Internet Privacy: at the intersection of visible and invisible 
worlds. United States Privacy Law and the Internet" (May, 2000) 16 Computer and High Tech LJ 
357,361. 
t-i David Bender and Danice M Kowalczyk ''Avoiding Intellectual Trespass in the Global 
Marketplace: encryption and privacy in e-conunerce" (2000) 2 VA JL & Tech 2. 
15 Reilly, above n 6. 
16 Power, above n 8. 236. 
17 Glancy, above n 13. 377; Jennifer McDennott "Privacy: an overview of recent English law 
developments" (1998) 3(5) Communications Law I 63. 
18 Seth Safier "Between Big Brother and the Bottom Line: privacy in cyberspace" (Spring, 2000) 
5 Va JL & Tech 6. 
4 
The view of the industry is that their self-regulatory initiatives are, or have the best 
potential to become, effective protectors of privacy. In the United States this view has 
largely succeeded. While piecemeal legislation aimed at specific industries has been 
implemented the primary means adopted for privacy protection is self-regulation. 
Is the industry's view correct, are self-regulatory measures effective? The conclusion 
reached is that while there are merits to these market initiatives important areas of 
· d 19 pnvacy are not protecte . The view supported is that of European Commission 
Director General John Mogg who believes that "self-regulation is a way towards 
achieving adequate levels of protection" but that it is unproven20 and not a 
comprehensive solution. 
The inadequacy of self-regulatory measures leads to the need for an effective 
alternative. Part IV explores other forms of protection that are either indirectly, via the 
courts, or directly, via legislation, controlled by the state. If an individual chose to bring 
a claim before the courts there are currently a variety of criminal, tortious and 
contractual remedies available in varying situations. However, even without the extra 
problems added by the Internet the courtroom is an ineffective means of protecting 
privacy. 
Does legislation and state-backed enforcement provide a better solution than self-
regulation? In contrast to the US the EU has adopted a rigorous approach to 
informational privacy protection via government enforcement. The conclusion reached 
is that a legislative scheme similar to that adopted by the EU must be put in place to 
effectively protect privacy. Legal provisions are needed to define, limit, and protect 
• 21 pnvacy. 
There is, however, a maJor obstacle in the way of an effective privacy protection 
scheme based on legislation and state control. The non-existence of a global legal and 
regulatory framework for Internet privacy protection22 creates serious jurisdictional 
hurdles for any country attempting to enforce its law. Part V concludes that to 
ameliorate these problems there must be a harmonisation of international law on 
19 Bel gum, above n I 0. 
20 
Will Rodger" o Privacy Embargoes for Now" ZDNet ews March 17 1999 at 
<www.zdnet.com>. 
o I 
- Bel gum, above n l 0 . 
22 
Bender and Kowalczyk, above n 14. 
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Internet privacy. To provide such a comprehensive system there are two major issues 
that must be resolved, which are explored in Part VI. Firstly, there must be clear and 
certain rules to determine which country has jurisdiction over the dispute and whose law 
will be applied. Secondly, it must be decided when Internet Service Providers (ISPs/J 
should be held vicariously liable for privacy breaches. 
Finally, there must be a means of enforcing the legislative principles of the international 
agreement. This enforcement mechanism is provided in Part VII. A system similar to 
that of the current Privacy Commission model in New Zealand is advocated. Under this 
system user complaints would be referred first to the data collector. If the user is 
unsatisfied he or she could take the action to a further body and then to a tribunal or a 
court. What is shown is that self-regulatory measures with legislative backing can work 
together, they are not diametrically opposed to each other. 
II. WHY THE INTERNET POSES SUCH A THREAT TO PRIVACY 
One may ask why there needs to be a different regune 111 place to protect personal 
information on the Internet as opposed to that already present for the real world. The 
reason is the new ways by which the Internet can hamper the ability of individuals to 
control their information. 
A. Collection 
First, and most importantly, there is the risk posed by collection of information from 
users surfing the net. Website traders collect large amounts of information openly, via 
such means as forms and surveys, often for the supposed purpose of registering an 
individual."4 Arguably consumers could protect themselves by choosing not to fill out 
the form, supplying false information or abstaining from using the service. Opt-in or 
opt-out forms might be provided so that the individual could theoretically prevent the 
collection of information. 
D The definition of an Internet service provider used is that provided for in the Online Copy1ight 
Infringement Liability Limitation Act 1998 (US), that is ··a provider of online services or network 
access, or the operator of facilities thereor·. This broad definition includes providers of Internet 
access, commercial on-line services, and operators of individual computer bulletin boards. 
s l 2(k)(l )(B) 
~.i Including information such as name. address. billing details. and credit card numbers . John 
Angel '·Legal Risks of Providing Services on the Internet" (1996) l (3) Communications Law 105, 
106. 
6 
A problem with all of these options is that as the cost of exit grows many consumers 
will find it harder to avoid the use of certain goods or services."5 This runs counter to a 
fundamental requirement of information privacy protection, that meaningful consent to 
collection must be obtained."6 This cost is growing because products and services are 
increasingly becoming contingent. That is, if the information holder does not provide 
the required information, or allow for its collection, access to sites or products will be 
denied. 
For example, I received this warning when trying to disable the cookies used by 
Yahoo.Com "Your login has expired. If you do not accept the cookies set on your login 
or your computer is not configured to accept cookies your session will expire almost 
immediately. We use cookies to assist us in user authentication and in saving 
configuration information". On the Internet users often therefore have little choice but 
to disclose the information to utilise the service."7 
Via this traditional method of collection the individual is at least aware that data is 
being collected and might have the opportunity to either consent to, or thwart, such 
collection. Of even greater danger is information collected covertly without a user's 
consent. Websites can access information about you simply because you visit their 
website. ISPs have the ability to monitor the use of services by subscribers to trace, for 
example, their buying habits."8 
A common means of covert data collection is via cookies."9 Cookies are small text files 
placed on users· hard drives that web sites can use to capture and track clickstream data. 
Unless a user is knowledgeable enough to set their browsers to notify them about the 
25 Reilly. above n 6, para 120. Opt-in and opt-out forms are also flawed for a number of other 
reasons. as is discussed in Part III. 
26 Leslie A Kurtz "The Invisible Becomes Manifest: infomrntion privacy in the digital age" [1998] 
38 Washburn Law Journal 151, 169. 
27 David J Klein "Keeping Business out of the Bedroom: protecting personal privacy interests 
from the retail world" (1997) 15 Journal of Computer and Information Law 391,393. 28 Angel, above n 24. l 06. 
19 
Givens, above n 9, 353. List agents and push technology are a further. more voracious, means 
of obtaining information. The more you use an agent the smarter it gets. Agents take note of such 
things as a user· s reading material and COITespondence, including the most frequent e-mail 
addresses. They memorise every piece of data and compare and contrast it to the next. In strong 
form, agents will memo1ise and process every mouseclick and purchase. Some agents remain on 
a server while others roam around cyberspace looking for information. Push technology, like 
agents, revolves around customer profiles. The user sets a profile and the push program does the 
rest. Each time the user logs on an identifier trips off a certain profile and the program starts 
collecting content and adve1tising according to that user·s profile. Safier, above n 18. 
6 
:rs 
,a 
to 
re 
:ie 
,y 
.n 
st 
g 
It 
s 
h 
s 
r 
r 
7 
pending placement of a cookie it is an invisible process.30 Usually when this transaction 
generated information is collected the user has already been through some form of 
traditional information collection.3 1 Unbeknownst to the user, data from the cookies on 
the user's hard drive can be combined with the personal information volunteered.
32 
In fact, vanous hardware and software systems assign umque identifiers to each 
personal computer, therefore they can identity and track the users. 33 For example, Real 
Networks34 allegedly surreptitiously monitors people· s listening habits, and certain 
other activities, and reports that information to RealJ ukebox - along with the user's real 
identity.35 This is not unusual, 48% of direct marketers actively mine the membership 
rosters of major online services for information.36 Even many health-related sites, such 
as those selling AIDs medicine, collect information from their users and disclose it to 
h. d · 37 t ir parties: 
There is an enormous potential for abuse as these unique identifiers are linked with the 
real identity of the user and could reveal any kind of information.38 Service providers 
might also have access to users' e-mail, where all types of personal information may be 
provided, and the facilities provided under which subscribers can create their own 
private databases.39 
B. Storage and Processing 
Compounding these collection problems are the unique storage and processing 
capabilities now available. With each new application, registration, or transaction, the 
body of information grows40 
This problem is exacerbated in the private sector as centralisation is occurring at an 
alarming rate. The industry has tended to move toward oligopoly and commonly (and 
30 Givens, above n 9, 353. 
31 Safier. above n 18. 
32 Toralf Noeding "Distance Selling in the Digital Age" (1998) 3 (3) Communications Law 85, 
90. 
31 David H Flaherty "Some Reflections on Privacy and Technology'' (1999) 26 Man U 219,220, 
226. 
34 A popular RealJukebox software. 
3' Eric J Sinrod and William P Reilly "Cyber-Crimes: a practical approach to the application of 
Federal computer c1ime laws" (May, 2000) J 6 Computer and High Tech U 177, 186. 
36 Safier, above n, J 8. 
37 Givens, above n 9, 355. 
38 Noeding, above n 32, 90. 
19 Angel, above n 24. 106. 
8 
increasingly frequently) these private actors buy and sell information lists, archives, and 
databases. Information from both public and non-public sources, from the online and 
the real world, could be combined to create one giant database.
41 Even information that 
has been available for a substantial length of time, from either private or governmental 
sources, becomes more available when readily accessible via the Internet and new 
databases can be constructed linking the information.42 Detailed profiles of individuals 
are available because of this growth of the capacity of intelligent software.
43 
When linked with identifiers the digital records being created pose a great risk to 
individual privacy.+1 It must be borne in mind that access to this personal data may not 
just be a threat to privacy but to personal safety. For example, men might be able to 
locate their battered spouses who have fled or stalkers might be able to locate their 
victims. The availability of identifying data can also facilitate the misdeeds of others. 
Criminals, for example, could use this information to perpetuate fraud. 
45 
Even more likely, however, is that employers, insurance companies, law enforcement 
officers, or the Government could use this knowledge to make biased decisions on 
information that previously would have been unavailable. They can increase their 
knowledge about your personal activities. Employers, for example, might be able to 
access records showing an employee, Julie, has visited sites which advocate certain 
sexual orientations, or unpopular political viewpoints. Julie might then be fired on the 
basis of that information , or denied promotional opportunities. 
Inaccuracy or unfairness might be captured, enhanced, repeated and distributed to create 
continuing damage and distress.46 The information about Julie· s proclivities might be 
sold to various entities and become known to potential customers, potential employers, 
family and so on. These privacy problems are exacerbated because the Internet allows 
for information to be captured at various locations by diverse means. For example, 
when Julie visits a website both the systems operator of that site, as well as her own 
systems provider, can monitor her activity. The data may be stored indefinitely and 
40 Safier, above n 18. 
41 Safier, above n 18. 
4
~ Kurtz, above n 26, 155. 
43 Flaherty, above n 37,226. 
44 It is clear that employers· collection and use of personal information also raises important 
concerns however, the focus of this essay is on Internet consumers· information protection. 
45 Carlson and Miller, above n 11, 86. 
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caching47 results in the creation of many copies of web pages that are not even under the 
control of the web site creator. Updates, corrections, and removals will not be reflected 
on cached copies that can survive for years.
48 
As well as enabling such potential abuse the consequences of human error are magnified 
in such an environment.
49 Unfair decisions may be made on the basis of inaccurate data. 
For example, a bank might refuse a loan to Julie on the basis of incorrect information, 
obtained from a list broker, stating that she was bankrupt. 
C. Dissemination 
It is not denied that these databases can, however, be beneficial. Benefits to consumers 
include enhanced efficiency, for example by avoiding repeated screening and 
authentication,50 and allowing people to, for example, find lost relatives. It is the 
policies for disbursing this information that have failed to keep this information secure 
and have often not restricted use of the information to the purpose for which it was 
given. It is assumed that McVeigh, for example, would never have consented to AOL 
releasing his true identity to the Navy. 
Large amounts of personal information may be easily accessed and transmitted 
worldwide within seconds.
51 The time and expense of accessing such information has 
been substantially decreased or virtually eliminated. Information might be directly used 
or sold to other companies, mainly to direct marketing services.
52 With the commercial 
value information now has, there is a heightened chance of trading in confidential 
information.53 For example, in America government agencies make significant amounts 
of revenue via the sale of records.
54 Illinois receives $10,000,000 a year from records 
sales and Rhode Island raises nearly half that by selling motor vehicle records alone.
55 
-16 Simon Chalton "Aspects of Privacy in Relation to Computers" Auckland District Law Society, 
October 1994, 7 .2 . 
47 Caching is the creation of an extra copy of a file or files, usually to make them more easily 
retrievable by the computer user. This can occur on the user's computer or other server 
computers. Kurtz, above n 26, 157 . 
.is Kurtz, above n 26, 153. 
-19 Timothy Miller '·Law, Privacy and Cyberspace" (1996) 4(1) Conununications Law 143, 
50 Safier, above n 18. 
51 Givens, above n 9, 353; Power. above n 8, 236. 
52 Sinrod and Jolish. above n 1. 
53 Miller, above n 49, 146. 
s-1 Kurtz. above n 26, 155. 
55 Belgum, above n 10. 
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D. Conclusion 
In the online environment consumers often have their ability to control information 
about themselves impaired or removed. Either users have little choice but to provide 
information due to the high cost of exit, or information may be taken from them without 
their knowledge. Once information collection has occun-ed the user has virtually no 
control over how it may be used. With huge databases combining personal information 
being created, and personal information being traded and sold, privacy on the Internet is 
placed at serious risk. In the words of the Chief Executive of Sun Microsystems "You 
already have zero privacy - get over it". 56 For these reasons there must be guidelines 
regulating when information can be collected and what can occur once collection has 
occun-ed.57 
Ill. SELF-REGULATION 
A. Types of Regulation 
Worldwide, different forms of regulation, providing different levels of data protection, 
have been utilised. The focus of this Part is on self-regulation, but following is a brief 
outline of these various measures to place self-regulation in context. 
1. Licensing 
Under licensing schemes each data controller must apply to a central authority for a 
license to collect and/or use data. Licenses might be granted for certain categories of 
data but may not include others. Data controllers periodically pay a fee for the license. 
The licensing authority has the power, in certain circumstances, to revoke the license. 
This would have a severely negative impact on the controller. Such a system was 
adopted, for example, in Sweden. This means was seen as appropriate as the use of 
personal identification numbers was widespread and the Government58 clearly had the 
ability to link personal data between different files. Licensing was seen as the best 
means of protecting citizens against privacy invasions.59 
56 John Markoff "Growing Compatibility Issue: computers and user privacy" New York Times, 
New York, Ame1ica, March 3 1999, Al. 
"
7 Kurtz, above n 26, 157. 
"
8 At the time the Act was enacted the Government was the main focus of p1ivacy concerns as it 
was the largest collector of information in Sweden. 
59 Greg Tucker "Frontiers of Information Privacy in Australia" ( 1992) 3( l) Journal of Law and 
Information Science 63 , 64. 
10 
tion 
1ide 
lOUt 
, no 
tion 
!t is 
You 
mes 
has 
1011, 
,rief 
x a 
s of 
nse. 
nse. 
was 
e of 
the 
best 
it 
11 
These systems are expensive and unwieldy. This is enhanced in the Internet context 
where both public and private sectors, and entities of all sizes, collect information and 
would have to register and receive licenses. Currently there is little support for such 
initiatives. Sweden itself is moving away from this model and towards a notification 
and registration scheme. 
60 
2. Notification and registration 
Under these schemes the data collector must notify a central authority of the personal 
files it has collected or is using. Unlike a licensing scheme there is no need for a 
positive assessment of any application. The collector can continue until otherwise 
advised by the authority.
61 
This was the form of protection adopted by the United Kingdom's (UK) Data Protection 
Act 1984 which provided for mass registration and gave the registrar the ability to 
deregister data controllers. Only a handful of countries adopted the UK's lead towards 
registration and this scheme has now been replaced.
62 In Ireland the Data Protection 
Act 1988 provided a registration scheme that was restricted to specific areas of sensitive 
data which were seen to warrant extra protection. 
6
J 
Registration schemes subject the central authority to a lighter burden and require less 
administration than a licensing scheme. They have, however, still been criticised for the 
high compliance and administration costs involved in registering, as well as the 
complexity of these regimes. It is for these reasons that registration was rejected in 
New Zealand.6-l These same factors would make a worldwide registration system 
unfeasible. 
3. Passive schemes 
In these less formal schemes the data protection authority promotes adherence to data 
protection principles amongst data controllers. Data controllers do not have to record 
details of the personal files they hold with the authority. The authority must use its 
60 Tucker, above n 59. 
61 Tucker. above n 59. 
62 Noeding. above n 32, 91. 
63 Tucker. above n 59, 65. 
6-l Privacy Commissioner New Privacy Protection - Discussion Paper No 12 (Auckland, 1997) 
19. 
12 
power of persuasion, its own investigations, or public complaints, for its effectiveness. 
The cost of this model to data controllers and the state is less than licensing and 
registration schemes. Sanctions may, or may not, be provided. For example the New 
South Wales scheme only gives the committee an investigatory and reporting role. It 
f 
. M 
has no en orcement capacity. · 
New Zealand's system falls within this category. A wide definition is adopted of those 
that must comply with the privacy principles, including any person, company or 
Government department, with important exceptions. The Privacy Commissioner has a 
range of functions including monitoring legislation, issuing codes of practice, and 
investigating complaints. Sanctions are provided, such as damages, costs, orders, and 
declarations. Systems with such sanctions may be better described as "reactive" rather 
than '·passive". This model is further discussed in part VII. These schemes and self-
regulatory measures are really the only two feasible options for cost-effective protection 
of privacy. 
4. Self-Regulation 
Self-regulation usually involves encouragement of data controllers by their 
Governments to adopt good data protection practices. Occasionally internal guidelines 
or codes of practice are developed within industries as a sign of good faith. 66 Initiatives 
that are undertaken under Government supervision but not under the direct regulation of 
Government are included. 67 
The US falls within this last category of protection. There is no agency committed to 
protecting privacy, and laws vary amongst states. The legislative approach has been 
described as ad hoe and sectoral.68 Most legislation has broadly dealt with the 
regulation of various entities that deal in personal information, such as the credit 
industry.69 However, the private sector has by and large not been targeted. This is 
problematic because, as previously mentioned, private organisations are heavily 
65 Tucker, above n 59, 65. 
66 Tucker, above n 59, 66. 
67 Margot Priest "The Privatization of Regulation: five models of self-regulation" ( 1997-8) 29 
Ottawa L Rev 233, 250. 
68 Scott Killingsworth "Minding Your Own Business: privacy policies in principle and in 
practice""(Fall, 1999) 7 J Intell Prop L 57, 77. For example: The Driver's P1ivacy Protection Act 
1994; Electronic Communications Privacy Act 1994; Right to Financial Privacy Act 1994. For 
further examples of such legislation see Debra A Valentine "Privacy on the Internet: the evolving 
legal landscape" (May, 2000) 16 Computer and High Tech LJ 401,407 . 
69 Bender and Kowalczyk, above n 14. 
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involved with information collection and use. Furthermore most regulation has 
focussed on the use of the information, versus collection or storage. At best only 
piecemeal protection is afforded.
70 
Despite this piecemeal legislation the most favoured form of protection online in the US 
is industry self-regulation.
71 It is the means advocated by the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC),
72 various groups and scholars
73, and the industry itself.74 The 
Clinton administration has favoured industry self-regulation while supporting the 
private sector in developing privacy regimes.
75 Self-regulatory measures can form the 
basis of a FTC action, if a website engages in deceptive acts or practices. However, the 
FTC cannot require websites to post privacy policies or to prescribe their content. If the 
website says nothing, instead of misrepresenting what it will do, it does not fall under 
the FTC' s authority.
76 In reality there is little regulation of data collection and use on 
the Internet. 77 
Why is legal regulation shunned? The main argument 1s based on the inability of 
legislation to control information flows. Statutes are seen to have only a limited 
capacity to protect information in a forum with no geographical boundaries.
78 Self-
regulatory initiatives do have the advantage of inevitably being established 
internationally due to the worldwide operation of communications companies.
79 
Self-regulation can be seen as favourable due to its flexibility to cope with increasing 
technological innovation and the constantly changing Internet environment. These 
industry initiatives, it is argued, are advantageous because they are made by those with 
the greatest expertise and sensitivity to Internet practices. It has also been claimed that 
70 Safier, above n 18. 
71 Bender and Kowalcyz, above n 14. 
72 See "Self-Regulation and Privacy Online: a Federal Trade Commission report to Congress" at 
<http: //www.ftc.gov/os/ 1999/9907 /pii vacy99 .pdf> 
73 Such as Peter Huber. 
74 This is the view taken by the Electronic Frontier Foundation and the Computer Professionals 
for Social Responsibility who favour almost complete exclusion from governmental intrusion. 
Killingsworth ,above n 68, 77; Reilly. above n 6. para 1-+0- I. 
75 Kurtz, above n 26. 171. 
76 Killingsworth, above n 68, 61. 
77 Givens, above n 9. 350. 
78 Thomas A Lipinski "The Developing Legal Infrastructure and the Globalisation of Information: 
constructing a framework for critical choices in the new millennium Internet - character, content 
and confusion (2000) 6 Rich JL and Tech 19. 
79 GUIDEC (General Usage for International Digitally Ensured Commerce) at 
<http://www.iccwbo.org/guidec2.htm>. 
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as self-regulatory measures are voluntarily adopted compliance will be broader and 
enforcement more prompt than when a legislature imposes its mandate.
80 
Looking at the problem cynically, probably the most attractive point in favour of self-
regulation from the Government" s perspective is that the industry bears the costs. 
Politically, a Government can reassure critics that the area is being regulated, while 
taking no direct responsibility for the regime.
81 
As part of this self-regulation different market based initiatives have been implemented 
and industry advocates claim that such protection is adequate. This essay advocates the 
principle of individual autonomy - the ability of the user to choose what information is 
collected, to determine how that information will be used, and to know what 
information is held about them. Does self-regulation adequately enable individual 
autonomy? 
B. Information Collection 
As noted, this stage is the most amenable to regulation as it may be the only time at 
which the data subject is directly involved and has the ability, if informed adequately, to 
assert his or her rights. 82 What means has the industry advocated as enabling the user to 
control and protect the privacy of their information? 
80 Valentine, above n 68,412. 
81 P1iest. above n 67. 269. 
8' - Belgum, above n I 0. 
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1. Opt-in versus opt-out provisions 
At the most elementary level is the debate between opt-in and opt-out prov1S1ons. 
Under an opt-out method the default position is that the information may be collected 
and used unless the customer indicates otherwise. This is the dominant form of 
information collection as it is the industry preferred approach.
83 Websites, who want 
user information for a variety of purposes, have a vested interest in using opt-out 
provisions and making the default terms of the contract relatively inaccessible. The 
incentives flow against opt-in provisions.
84 
Opt-out provisions are, however, unsatisfactory. At the time information is collected 
the user has a right to be fully informed. This includes knowledge of, for example, the 
fact that information is being collected and the intended recipients of the information.
85 
Users may not be aware of the default terms and conditions of their privacy. It is also 
difficult and time consuming for consumers to locate and comply with the opt-out. 
If an opt-in form is used the user may decide if they wish their information to be 
collected and used, which enables some form of user control and consent. Opt-in 
provisions are one avenue that might give the user some control over collection. 
Unfortunately even if this specific consent is given it is often difficult to establish the 
boundaries of that consent. 8
6 For example, did that individual consent to having that 
information combined with previous data? Was the sale of that data to third parties 
assented to? It is also difficult to apply these ideas of notice and consent to information 
obtained without the user· s knowledge. These covert collection methods would have to 
be substantially changed for opt-in provisions to be effective.
87 
A problem for both opt-in and opt-out provisions is the increasing cost of, as exit noted 
above. If the cost of exit becomes too high the consumer is left with no real choice but 
to provide the information requested. It is clear that consent is meaningless if 
consumers must consent to receive the benefit or service.
88 A further problem with 
83 Reilly, above n 6. para 120: Kurtz. above n 26. 170. 
84 Walter A Effross "Conm1ercial Profiles or Suspect Classifications?: preparing, preventing and 
pan·ying public and private profiling" (1999) Stan Tech L Rev 9. 
85 P1ivacy Act 1993. Principle 3 (NZ). 
86 This is noted in the Australian Privacy Charter 1994. 
87 Kurtz, above n 26, 170. 
88 Reilly, above n 6, para 120. 
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both types of provision is that a fundamental issue is left unresolved, what happens if 
the collector disregards its obligation? 
2. Technological solutions 
There are technical measures available that might enhance privacy protection. These 
measures are touted by the industry as giving the consumer the ability to protect their 
own privacy if they choose. This essay is not concerned with a detailed analysis of such 
protection therefore only the main forms will be briefly discussed.
89 
One such measure is anonymity. If users are aware that information 1s going to be 
collected they can visit an anonymising site when login first occurs. For example, 
Community ConneXion has created an Anonymizer website that shields a consumer's 
personal information from further websites that are visited.
90 While analysts believe 
that eventually a suitable formulation will be arrived at for anonymity, currently there 
are a number of flaws with these forms of protection. Firstly, transactions that occur in 
cyberspace must eventually link with the real world and therefore the real identity of the 
user. Secondly, the inability to trace information could reduce the benefits of data 
gathering mechanisms such as smartcards and agents. Thirdly, the individual must have 
the ability and knowledge to use such technology and must be aware that information 
might be collected. If users are unaware information is being collected they will 
probably not visit an anonymising site. Lastly, the anonymising website knows the true 
identity of the surfer and could compile it" s own user profile, therefore there must be 
adequate protection against this occurring.
9 1 
Another common means of protection is encryption. This allows for messages to be 
sent via the Internet that cannot be read by an outside party.
92 Many businesses use 
robust encryption to secure information while being transmitted or stored. Many 
individuals are also utilising encryption to protect their private communications.
93 
Software is already freely available on the Internet that produces such strong encryption 
89 Other options that might be available include: the use of smart cards to protect identity, active 
badges, passwords, audit trails and so on. 
90 <http://www.anonymizer.com>. 
9 1 Reilly, above n 6, 127. 
92 Linda Tsang and others "Focus: e-commerce" Law Society"s Gazette (6 October 1999) 96 (38), 
25 . 
93 Kurt M Saunders 'The Regulation of Internet Encryption Technologies: separating the wheat 
from the chaff' ( 1999) 17 Journal of Computer and Information Law 945. 
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that current computers would take millions of years to decode keys that are only a 
several hundred digits long.
94 However, like anonymity encryption does not help with 
information that is obtained covertly. Transaction generated information cannot be 
blocked via encryption. 
Looking to the future there are plans for a privacy mechanism to be embedded in 
cookies and related technologies.
95 However, even if these measures are developed and 
implemented, as users gain more awareness and better blocking techniques the 
collection agencies will adopt equal sophistication.
96 Furthermore, to reach a point 
where any of these measures are acceptable there must be a great deal of consumer 
education.97 Hardware and software products that can offer consumers protection must 
also be easy so that the majority of people can utilise them freely.
98 There must also be 
consumer trust.99 To acquire the necessary trust there must be an effective enforcement 
mechanism in place. Of primary importance is the fact that none of these measures 
provide for enforcement or protection for the use of information after it has been 
collected in a decoded form. 
3. Open Profiling System(OPS) and Platform for Privacy Preferences Project (P3P) 
New protocols are being developed in an attempt to address privacy problems in relation 
to data collection. These technologies have the ability to both enhance privacy and 
expand the potential to market information. Both P3P
100 and OPS 101 are examples of 
9
-1 One of the safest methods currently available uses a combination of public and private keys. 
One key is published as an openly accessible directory, the p1ivate key is only known to the 
owner. The OECD has recognised the right of individuals to encrypt their messages. However, in 
America encryption has been fought against by law enforcement agencies that fear that such 
technology will be used by terrorists and criminals. A discussion of this issue is beyond the scope 
of this paper but see: Madeleine Colvin "Covert Policing and the Convention" (1997) 147 no 
6820, I 821; Wayne Madsen et al "Cryptography and Liberty: an international survey of 
encryption policy" (l 998) 16 Journal of Computer and Information Law 475;John T Soma and 
Charles P Henderson "Encryption. Key Recovery. and Commercial Trade Secret Assets: a 
proposed legislative model"' (I 999) 25 Rutgers Computer and Tech LI 97. 
95 Reilly above n 6, para 132 and Kurtz. above n 26, I 70-171. 
96 Safier, above n I 8. 
97 Reilly. above n 6, para 127. 
98 Reuters "EU Seeks E-privacy Protection" ZDNet News May 21 1999 at <www.zdnet.com>. 
99 Reilly. above n 6, para 127. 
100 P3P is similar to OPS but is in the early stages of development. P3P is being constructed by 
the World Web Consortium (WWC). WWC is an industry standards group comprised of more 
than 200 businesses and academic institutions. 
101 See Open Profiling Standard Frequently Asked Questions (May 27, 1997) at 
<http://www.developer.netscape.com/ops/opsfaq.html>. OPS was created by more than 60 
companies, including Netscape and Microsoft. Kurtz, above n 6, 17 I . 
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"secure, automated. one to one applications for the instantaneous formulation of legal 
and social contracts and agreements associated with business processes". 
102 
In both examples a user creates a personal profile with his or her information, which at 
the user· s option can be securely stored in a corporate-wide or global directory. The 
first time that an individual visits a website that supports one of the programmes the 
website requests information from the personal profile. The individual can then choose 
to release all, some, or none of the requested information, and can authorise further use 
of that material without permission. If the website collects additional information it 
can, with the user's permission, store that information on the profile.
10
·
1 In theory the 
individual can determine the level of privacy that he or she requires. 
Significantly these programs will allow for both the expression of privacy practices and 
a notification system, as well as the secure storage, transport and release of data. ,0-1 
Technology such as P3P may ultimately resolve some of the privacy problems - in 
particular those relating to the collection and security of data. Unfortunately these 
systems are currently flawed. If, for example, P3P was used the user would be blocked 
from many sites. This may be unacceptable to consumers. Additionally to use the 
system a certain level of computer literacy is required to set the preferences to attain the 
desired level of protection. Furthermore, the future of these measures is far from 
certain. For example, P3P itself is in doubt. The Consortium failed to release the 
measure onto the market by its deadline and one of the former Consortium members has 
filed a patent for the technology.
105 
These measures do not adequately protect information that has been collected. Once the 
individual releases the Personal Profile to a website there is no technical way to prevent 
a website from reusing or sharing that information. Websites are therefore encouraged 
to post privacy policies and consumers are encouraged not to release information if a 
site does not have one. Again the question must be asked, what happens if the policy is 
not adhered to? Promises might be disregarded and all of the information might be 
taken, although this could be alleviated somewhat by encryption, 
106 or misused. For a 
more in depth discussion of privacy policies see below. 
102 Reilly, above n 6, para 130. 
i o:i Reilly, above n 6, para l 30. 
IQ.I Reilly, above n 6, para 132 and Kurtz, above n 26, 170-71. 
105 Sinrod and Barak, above n I. 
106 Reilly, above n 6, para 136-7. 
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C. Information Use and Disclosure 
As noted, information should only be stored, used, and disclosed to third parties, 111 
limited circumstances, such as explicit authorisation, consent at the time of collection, 
or for law enforcement purposes. For self-regulation to be effective there must be 
sufficient measures in place to ensure that these principles are adhered to. Are there 
currently such measures? 
1. Codes of practice and privacy policies 
Self-regulatory measures commonly take the form of a company's own privacy 
principles. Sometimes companies adopt trade association codes of fair information 
practices. Under current US law, companies are at liberty to choose which policies they 
implement and how to enforce such a policy. 
107 
Merely adopting a privacy policy, however, is not enough, it must also be followed. For 
example AOL, the ISP that released McVeigh's information without his consent, 
disregarded its own privacy policy. AOL · s policy states that "America Online Inc is 
strongly committed to protecting the privacy of consumers of its interactive products 
and services". 108 To ensure compliance it is widely recognised that fair information 
practice codes should contain enforcement mechanisms. 
109 
Unfortunately these policies have not been effective. In a recent study over 90% of 
websites studied were found to collect data from their users. Less than l 0% had privacy 
policies that contained all of the FfC' s crucial privacy policy requirements of notice, 
access, security and third party disclosure.
11 0 Most policies simply provide notice and 
opt-out, while ignoring the other principles.
111 The FfC found that websites soliciting 
personal information, including only those overtly collecting information, usually did 
107 For a useful discussion see Peter Schnaitman "Building a Community Through Workplace E-
mail: the new privacy frontier'' ( 1998/ l 999) 5 Mich Telecomm Tech L Rev 177. 
108 AOL.com, Privacy Policy at <http://www.aol.com/info/p1ivacy.htrn.l>. 
109 Valentine, above n 68,407. 
110 The FTC looked for notice, choice regarding data use. access, security and enforcement. Mary 
J Culnan, Georgetown Internet Privacy Policy Study (July 21 , 1999) at 
<http://www.msb.edu/faculty/culnann/gippshome.htm1>. 
111 Givens. above n 9,355. 
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not contain any posted privacy policy. 112 This is particularly concerning as the FfC 
standards are not particularly onerous and are not as stringent or as broad as the 
European protection. 
In June 1998 the FfC summarised the problem with industry self-regulation in regards 
to privacy: 
Despite the Commission· s three year pnvacy initiative supporting a self-
regulatory response to consumer privacy concerns, the vast majority of online 
businesses have yet to adopt even the most fundamental fair information trade 
practice (notice/awareness) ... In addition, the guidelines, with limited 
exception, contain none of the enforcement mechanisms needed for an effective 
If I · I I , se -regu atory regime. -
A pertinent example of this failure is provided by the Geocities case.
114 Geocities was 
one of the most visited websites on the Internet. It provided a "virtual community" 
which offered a variety of services, including free e-mail and clubs, as well as hosting 
members· home pages. Both mandatory and optional information was requested on its 
application form. Via website statements, members were assured that the mandatorily 
provided information would only be shared with third parties for the purpose of 
providing them with the particular advertising they requested. They were also assured 
that their optional information would only be released with their permission. The 
information was in reality being sold or rented to third parties that used it for other 
purposes. 11 5 What this example clearly shows is that in reality self-regulation may equal 
1 · 11 6 no regu at1on. 
11 2 Belgum. above n 10. 
111 Federal Trade Commission. "Conclusions" in "Privacy Outline: A Report to Congress" (last 
modified June 9, l 998)at <http://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy3/conclu.htm>. 
114 In the matter ofGeoCities, a corporation, FTC File No 9823015, at 
<http://www.ftc.gov/os/ 1999/9902/98230 l 5cmp.htm> 
11 5 A case was bought against Geocities by the FTC whjch was settled via a consent order that 
prohibited Geocities from misleading its customers about data collection, use or rusclosure and 
from misrepresenting who was actually collecting the personal information. l(j\lingsworth, above 
n 68, 60. 
11 6 Tucker, above n 59. 66. 
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2. Privacy seals and trustmarks 
A further privacy enhancing measure, and a form of market self-regulation, is that of 
privacy seals or trustmarks. TRUSTe is the oldest such initiative and is the leading 
privacy seal program supporter. TRUSTe
11 7 gives seals to those websites that adhere to 
its privacy policy. 
11 8 Websites that obtain the seal must disclose to the consumer and to 
TRUSTe which information they gather, how the information will be used and who they 
share the information with. They must also promise to submit their sites to periodic 
audits. 11 9 TRUSTe can use technical measures to detect any privacy policy changes that 
. I d ,~o are imp emente . -
Another example of a trustmark system is the BBBOnLine Privacy Program (BBB) 
created by the Better Business Bureau. The BBB is intended to compete with the 
TRUSTe seal. TRUSTe is associated with Internet brands such as Microsoft and 
Nasdaq while BBB is associated with main street America. The principles at the base of 
this program are encouraging. The program requires adherence to rigorous principles of 
notice, disclosure, choice, consent and access. Participants must explain their policies 
in plain English. On every page that data is collected there must be a link to the privacy 
policy. This should enable a user to make an informed choice on the collection of 
information. 121 
Importantly, BBB provides an enforcement system. As noted this is a prerequisite of 
any effective privacy protection system. The system sets up an arbitration process that 
consumers can use to protest unfair or deceptive conduct.
122 BBB can also conduct 
unscheduled inspections of websites. As part of the program the companies agree to 
provide the restitution that BBB dictates, apart from fines. 
123 As punishment BBB 
could remove its seal or refer complaints to the Federal Trade Commission.
124 Both 
11 7 TRUSTe was founded by CommerceNet and the Electronic Frontier Foundation and began in 
1997. 
11 8 Rodger, above n 20. 
11 9 Bender and Kowalczyk, above n 14. 
120 Killingsworth, above n 68, 86. 
121 Yinka Adegoke ·'US Seals Online Custom with Privacy Mark" (April 5. 1999) The Lawyer, 
Centaur Conmmnications Limited. 
122 Adegoke. above n 121. 
123 Maria Seminerio "BBBOnline Introduces its 'Trustmark'" ZDNet News March 17. 1999 at 
<www.zclnet.com>. 
124 Rodger, above n 20. 
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BBB and TrustE could also sue for breach of promises in its licensing contract. 
125 
BBB 
will accept complaints against any website, not just those that are part of the program. 
126 
BBB has also had some success in membership numbers and coverage. By April 1999 
more than 300 companies had applied to become members. BBB also coordinates with 
local BBBs to provide privacy information and model privacy policies to businesses 
worldwide. 127 The BBB believes its strong brand recognition outside the Internet will 
give the seal credibility and help it to grow. The BBB has 270,000 members offline and 
about one quarter of those have websites. 
128 
An obvious advantage of these "seals" is that the cost is borne by the industry itself. 
The program members pay a licensing fee of between $150 and $3000 depending on 
their size and corporate sponsors are funding the program· s start up costs, by paying 
between 50,000 and 100,000 dollars. 129 TRUSTe has a similar sponsorship program and 
its licensees pay between $300 and $5000. 130 
Noeding believes that such schemes, once accepted, will do more for privacy protection 
than data protection legislation could ever hope to achieve. 131 If money and power back 
these schemes up they can be effective and enforceable. Unfortunately, to date, only a 
tiny percentage of companies on the net have actually signed up for such regulation. 
132 
The purpose of such initiatives is also problematic. Are these private sector groups 
acting to protect consumer or industry interests? The problem with these groups 
monitoring information use and collection is that they are often comprised of industry 
versus consumer interest groups. The industry's focus is clearly more on the desire for 
the new currency of information than consumer rights. 133 
Not only are industry initiatives self-interested but they are also likely to display 
favouritism. That is, they will be dominated by larger companies and will pursue their 
125 Killingsworth, above n 68, 86. 
126 Seminerio, above n 1'23. 
I '7 - Adegoke, above n 1'21. 
128 Seminerio, above n 123. 
129 The BBB is sponsored by more than 20 global companies. 
130 Seminerio. above n l '23. 
111 Noeding, above n 36, 9'2. 
132 Rodger, above n 20. 
1:n Bender and Kowalczyk, above n 14. 
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own interests - not the interests of the industry, let alone the public. 
134 Even Hendricks, 
author of Privacy Times, believes such programs are not adequate, particularly as there 
is no assurance that they will be widely adopted. However, he believes that such 
measures could provide the basis for privacy laws.
135 
3. Voluntary agreements ivith the Government 
In the US a significant number of participants in the online advertising industry have 
entered an agreement with the FTC as to rules governing the tracking of Web surfers. 
Online marketers have agreed to refrain from combining online data with offline 
information banks. They agreed to secure approval first, but only via opt-out 
provisions. Clearly displayed opt-out provisions so the user can avoid tracking by the 
marketers must also be provided. A complete ban on using sensitive information has 
been agreed to. The advertisers must also agree to give consumers access to personally 
identifiable data and demand that the e-commerce sites they use contractually commit to 
follow the advertising firm's privacy policy. Enforcement will occur via an industry-
funded agency. 136 
What this shows is that federal regulators still believe that self-regulation can be 
successful. It remains to be seen whether this faith is well-founded. The agreement 
itself may be criticised as only opt-out provisions are included. These have already 
been found wanting and affirmative consent should be gained. Again this system doe 
not provide universal coverage or a general privacy code but only caters for part of one 
sector, the advertising arena. It is just another part of an already confusing and ad hoe 
form of protection. Whether this agreement will be adhered to, and whether the 
enforcement mechanism will be effective, is questionable. The problem with industry 
based enforcement groups noted above are equally applicable here. 
134 Priest. above n 67, '273 . 
135 Seminerio, above n 123. 
136 Glenn R Simpson and Jerry Guidera "Online-Advertising Group Agree to Protect Privacy of 
Consumers· Data" The Wall Street Journal, 28 July 2000. 
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D. Information Storage 
Once information has been collected and stored by the data collector it is relatively easy 
for that collector to protect the security of the information against most outside 
interference. Encryption and data security techniques can make Internet information 
inaccessible as a practical matter. m Due to encryption most information sent out can be 
protected unless up against a dedicated hacker. Firewalls can be used to protect local 
area networks from unwanted interrogation by outsiders. However, the best security 
measures cannot prevent privacy invasions if staff are not trained on using the measures 
or required to follow privacy policies. 138 
E. Cyber-Courts 
A word should be said on the approach advocated by certain theorists who support the 
establishment of a cyber-court to govern the Internet, perhaps even set up within the 
Internet. It is argued that such a court is better suited to the online environment as it 
would avoid the jurisdictional problems discussed in part VI. This online forum would 
also, according to its advocates, be more knowledgable about Internet practices than 
real-world courts and government agencies. 139 
Johnson and Post argue that cyberspace can create its own law and legal institutions. 
They believe a consensually based set of rules will emerge from a self-governing 
community of online users. Those subject to these "laws" would remain free to move 
among different online spaces. 140 How an online court would work mechanically is not 
clear. Hardy imagines online cyberspace hearings, with judges, juries and attorneys. 
The sanction meted out would be expulsion from the relevant part of cyberspace.
14 1 
In the Internet context a transnational dispute resolution body may soon become a 
reality for domain name disputes. In 1997 the "Generic Top Level Domain 
117 Glancy, above n 13, 364. 
138 Northern Legal Office Exhibition, The Lawyer, October 14 1997, Centaur Communications 
Limited, 8. 
139 Peter Bartlett "Internet: the legal tangle" [1995) 11 (4) Computer Law and Practice 110, 112. 
I-IO Johnson and Post "Law and Borders - the rise of law in cyberspace" (May 1996) 48 Stan L 
Rev 1367. 
141 Trotter Hardy "The Proper Legal Regime for Cyberspace" (Summer 1994) 55 U Pitt L Rev 
993, 1053. 
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Memorandum of Understanding" established a procedure for resolving domain name 
disputes, which was widely adopted with many signatories from around the world. This 
was developed by the World Intellectual Property Organisation and a Policy Oversight 
Committee. A panel of international experts was established to receive petitions from 
rights holders to determine if the domain name policy has been violated. Included in the 
system is online mediation, arbitration at the option of the right holder, and 
Administrative Domain Name Challenge Panels. This system has the advantage of 
having no impact on national court jurisdiction.
142 
This sort of court might provide an alternative dispute resolution forum
143 and might be 
viable for arbitration clauses in commercial contracts. 
144 However, it is not appropriate 
for a mainstream communications network
145 that has the potential for large breaches of 
privacy. According to Trout-McIntyre there are numerous problems with cyber-courts. 
For example, if the court is to be based on new governing "laws"what happens if these 
governing "laws" fail to emerge? Johson and Post do not address this problem, rather 
they take it for granted. These courts would also encourage forum shopping as the user 
would have another forum in which to bring a suit. Furthermore there are serious 
problems with judicial tenure and jury accommodation.
146 For such a system to work a 
great deal of international cooperation would also be required. It is unlikely that a 
government would acquiesce to this sort of jurisdiction. 
147 The creation of cyber-courts 
would probably therefore "create more problems than they could alleviate". 
148 
142 See <http://www.gtldmou.org/presentations/cg-jan22/index.htm>. For a description see Clive 
Elliott "The Internet - a new world without frontiers" (Nov 1998) NZLl 405, 408. There are 
further programs that work with users to resolve conflicts that arise from Internet use, such as the 
Virtual Magistrate Project and Ombuds Online Project. See Tanuny S Trout-McIntyre for a 
discussion of these initiatives "Personal Jurisdiction and the Internet: doe the shoe fit" (Fall, 
1997) 21 Hamline L Rev 223. 267. 
143 Bartlett, above n 139, 112. 
i,w The Honourable Michel Bastarache "The Challenge of the Law in the New Millennium" 
(1998) 25 Man LJ 411,417. 
145 Bartlett, above n 139, 112. 
146 Trout-McIntyre, above n 142. 259. 
147 Bastarache, above n 144. 4 I 7. 
148 Trout-McIntyre analyses the establishment of a cyber-court in her ai1icle. above n 142, 259. 
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F. Conclusion 
I have reached the conclusion that it is doubtful that a self-regulatory approach will 
provide sufficient protection, particularly for access and enforcement. 149 The question 
then raised is can self-regulation become effective? For this to occur there must be 
sufficient incentives for companies to implement adequate protection or join privacy 
schemes. As increased privacy would lead to increased Internet business this might 
provide an incentive. It goes without saying that most private companies are profit 
driven. There is clearly enormous growth potential for e-commerce and the Internet. 
By 2002 e-commerce is expected to grow to C$653 billion globally. 150 Many non-users 
have cited privacy as the most important reason for staying off the Internet. 15 1 
There are encouraging signs that this concern is motivating Internet data collectors to 
take action. Currently the so-called "800-Ib gorillas" of the online world are throwing 
their weight behind privacy policies. Last year both IBM and Microsoft, the Internet's 
two largest advertisers, announced that they would not advertise on websites without 
posted privacy policies. Disney· s "Go Network" went even further and stated that it 
would not advertise on, or accept advertising from, websites that did not have 
comprehensive privacy policies. 15" These large corporates have the potential to exert 
substantial pressure on websites. 
However, lack of consumer confidence and negative publicity have so far not proven to 
be a significant enough incentive for comprehensive privacy protection by the industry. 
As consumers are currently often unaware of privacy breaches there may be little 
negative publicity. For example, despite Geocities privacy breaches the site remains the 
second most popular site for New Zealand surfers. 153 While studies clearly show 
consumers have fears about their privacy, and that some are refraining from transactions 
because of this, the volume of online sales and the growth of the Internet is still 
exploding. Therefore, while consumer concern might be an incentive for some 
organisations that wish to increase their sales, this is not an adequate incentive for all 
149 Ku11z, above n 26. 173. 
15° Fasken Martineau DuMoulin "E-Conunerce Canada" International Law Office Nov 1999 at 
<http://www.intemationallawoffice.com/ld.cfm?Newsletters_Ref=l 233>. 
151 Belgum, above n l 0. 
15
" Killingsworth. above n 68, 67 . 
m Nigel Horrocks (ed) NZ NetGuide (Industrial Press Ltd, Auckland, 2000) Issue 40. June 2000, 
16. 
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organisations that collect information from the Internet. With the cost of exit increasing 
there is less chance that consumer confidence will provide a sufficient incentive. Also, 
not all Internet data collectors are engaged in e-commerce and therefore do not fear bad 
publicity or a loss of product sales. 
Additionally the tangible benefits obtained by the market from privacy breaches 
probably outweigh the possible negative publicity that may be incurred. Personal 
information primarily raises revenue. Information can be onsold, traded, used to target 
services or to attain advertising. Information as to customers likes and dislikes is 
invaluable in such an environment. A recent study by Cimex found that one out of 
every 13 jobs in the United States was the result of direct marketing sales activity. The 
study also found that direct marketing sales to consumers reached $630 billion in 1996, 
compared to $458 billion in 1991. 154 As the value of personal information skyrockets so 
does the potential for abuse. 
A further incentive might be provided by the industry fear that unless self-regulation is 
effectively implemented the public might demand the imposition of heavy-handed 
government regulation. 155 The recent agreement between advertising agencies and the 
FTC mentioned above was entered into because of such a threat. However, that might 
be a risk that the industry is prepared to take. Indeed it seems intuitively unlikely that 
predominantly profit-driven organisations will have the motivation required to enact a 
sufficiently stringent scheme. 
It is acknowledged that solutions to collection problem can be partially provided via 
technical means. However, these methods are far from foolproof and as it is virtually 
impossible to suppress information that has already found its way to the web, strong 
controls and incentives need to be put in place to prevent the misuse of information. 
The enormous power and potential for abuse held in the hands of Internet data 
collectors must be kept in mind. McVeigh lost his career over an e-mail and an ISP"s 
disregard for his privacy. 
Individual industry initiatives that may not be widely adopted are probably not capable 
of providing the certainty and clarity required. Even with more websites participating in 
154 Such as jobs designing and selling advertising. supplying and selling customer and consumer 
lists and profiles to direct-response businesses. Safier. above n 18. 
155 Belgum, above n 10. 
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privacy programs it is a real risk that only a self-selecting pool of Websites will 
voluntarily agree to regulate themselves. 156 Self-regulation is unlikely to provide an 
equitable or adequate solution without some form of public governance. When this is 
coupled with the potential for abuse and the Jack of incentives and market success to 
date it is clear that some form of government enforcement is required. 
IV. STATE BACKED PROTECTION 
A. Recourse to the Courts: an indirect form of state regulation 
There is a currently a confusing array of laws which directly or indirectly have some 
impact on data protection. There are actions available for such things as breach of 
confidence, privileged communications, trespass, and the implied contractual duty of 
secrecy. For example, there have been numerous civil suits filed against plaintiffs 
allegedly harmed by anonymous Internet postings but the underlying causes of action 
have varied from defamation to privacy to unauthorised possession of proprietary 
information. 157 The criminal law has also been utilised to provide limited protection of 
data, in particular by computer crime legislation. 158 
In theory informational privacy would be protected as tortfeasors would have to pay for 
the damage suffered and because private lawsuits in conjunction with public scrutiny 
can motivate information providers to implement and adhere to sufficient privacy 
policies. However, these laws at best only provide incidental protection 159 and there are 
glaring inefficiencies inherent in such a liability regime. The confusing number of 
actions leads to procedural complexity making it hard for consumers to ascertain their 
rights. This in tum makes it hard for data collectors to establish their responsibilities. 
This complexity also leads to increased transaction costs. 160 
156 Sinrod and Jolish. above n 1. 
157 David L Sobel "The Process that "John Doe" is Due: addressing the legal challenge to Internet 
anonymity (2000) 5 VA JL & Tech 3. para 13. Bartlett, above n 139, 110. Cases have also been 
fought in America over the sale of information to direct mail advertisers without consent Shibley v 
Time Inc 341 NE 2d 337, 339 (Oh App 1976); and the gathering of personal information from 
Internet users without consent Newby v Alexa Internet and Ama::;on.com, C 00 0054, US Distiict 
Court, Nortern District of California (filed Jan 6 2000); Double click has also been subject to a 
similar claim. Reilly, above n 6. para 106. 
158 In the late 1990"s in America there were nearly 40 cases on the criminal use of e-mail alone. 
Samuel A Thumma and DruTel S Jackson "The History of Electronic Mail in Litigation" (1999) 
16 Computer and High Tech L J 27. 
159 Tucker, above n 59, 79. 
160 Flaherty ,above n 37, 220. 
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As with any action it is usually too expensive, stressful, and tedious to have recourse to 
the courts. A trial will also often involve the further disclosure of personal information. 
Furthermore significant personal harm is often required. The difficulty this raises for 
protecting informational privacy on the Internet is that often the damage suffered by an 
individual is minimal but many people may be minimally injured. 
161 
A brief look at the protection afforded by the privacy tort will serve to illustrate this 
point. Consumers today receive a modicum of protection via the common law doctrine 
of invasion of privacy.
162 The common law torts fail because they do not protect 
actions taken in public and the Internet is arguably a public environment.
163 Indeed 
recourse to legal protection often depends on reasonable expectations of privacy. 
164 
This is often hard to establish in a public environment like the Internet. Issues arise as 
to whether a user reasonably expected privacy when he or she accessed the Internet. Is 
a chat room, for example, public or private? It is argued by some that if a user sends an 
e-mail via the Internet that it would be unreasonable for an action to arise as it is 
commonly known that the Internet is not secure. 
165 A further hurdle is that, as noted, 
much of the information in question while personal is not private. Normally the privacy 
invasion must also have been unreasonable. 1
66 It is clear that privacy does not provide 
significant protection for the offline world let alone the new online environment. 
Some countries, such as Britain and Australia, do not even recognise the existence of a 
common law right to privacy. 167 In fact for any court claim each jurisdiction will have 
different statutes and common Jaw actions to apply. This disparity leads to complex 
jurisdictional issues and the potential for forum shopping, which is further discussed in 
Part VI. Most companies are therefore basically impervious to tortious suits, due to the 
problems discussed above coupled with the issues raised by cross-jurisdictional 
transactions. These actions therefore provide little incentive to protect privacy. 
168 
161 Lipinski, above n 78. 
162 In New Zealand the common law right of privacy wa eaffim1ed recently by the High Court in 
P v D. Bell Gully "Media Law" May 2000 at <http://www.bellgully.com>. 
163 See Bel gum, above n I 0, who provides an analysis of why the four p1ivacy torts rarely apply to 
online privacy violations. See also Glancy, above n 13. 
164 Glancy, above n 13. 
165 Angel, above n 24, 109. 
166 Glancy, above n 13. 367. 
167 A description of the common law position in England is noted Angel, above n 27, I 69. 
168 Reilly. above n 6, para 108. 
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A Contractual Model? 
Would allowing Internet users· informational rights to be determined solely by contract 
provide a solution? Traditionally personal information has not been viewed as 
belonging to the information subject. 169 However, ownership and use of information 
has pointed to the emergence of an Internet regime based on private contract.
170 
Contractual entitlements are corning to the fore in the United States. Under this 
approach the individual would voluntarily disclose personal information in exchange for 
some benefit, either money or more likely an online credit, 
17 1 
thereby forming a 
contract. Negotiating these exchanges can be quick, easy, and largely cost free.
172 
Market forces and consumer pressure have led to some business entities involved in the 
collection, storage and use of personal information on the web guaranteeing greater 
legal protection by offering a sort of quasi-contract that exchanges the use of a service 
for personal information. 173 These companies are moving towards viewing information 
as a person· s property. 
However, the typical problems of imperfect information would apply to such a 
contractual system. Firstly, there is a Jack of consumer education. An uniformed user 
cannot truly consent to the collection or use of the information. In particular consent is 
impossible when information is taken surreptitiously. Secondly, there is inequality of 
bargaining power. Most individual users are not in the position in which to bargain. As 
noted above, the cost of exit is constantly increasing, making the reality of equal 
bargaining partners unrealistic. The user wants or needs to use the service or product 
and currently the provider is in the position to prevent access if information is not 
169 Kat1ine Evans Privacy and Publicity: restraining abuses of power in New Zealand (LLM, 
Victoria University of Wellington) 61. 
170 Lipinski, above n 78. 
171 Examples of authors who have analysed p1ivacy issues from a market perspective are: Richard 
S Murphy .. Property Rights in Personal Information: an economic defence of privacy" ( 1996) 84 
Geo U 2381: Paul M Schwartz "Privacy and the Economics of Personal Healthcare Information" 
( 1997) 76 Tex U Rev l: Peter P Swire "Cyberbanking and Privacy: the contracts model" 
(abstract of talk for computers, freedom and privacy 1997, San Francisco. March 1997) at 
<http://www.osu.edu/units/law.swire.htm>; Electronic P1ivacy Information Centre, Repo11 49-1, 
Privacy Guidelines for National Information Infrastructure: a review of the proposed principles of 
the privacy working group at 2( I 994) available at <http://www.epic.org/privacy/internet/EPJC 
NII privacy.txt>. 
17
~ Reilly, above n. 6. 
173 Reilly, above n, 6. 
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provided. Lastly there is an inability to tailor agreements for the individual. 
174 Without 
tailored contracts the intention of the user is unclear. 
It is acknowledged that contract will to some extent be determinative. There will be 
situations were there is parity between the user and the information collector and a 
genuinely negotiated contract. In these cases the contracts formed should be treated no 
differently to those entered into in a traditional manner. 
175 In fact I advocate contractual 
negotiations between the user and collector in certain circumstances as part of the 
solution provided in Part VII. However, allowing informational rights to be determined 
solely by contract would lead to the majority of agreements being "drafted unilaterally 
by a dominant party and then presented on a 'take it or leave it basis· to the weaker 
party with no real opportunity to bargain concerning the terms of the contract". 
176 
Enforcing contracts across different jurisdictions again raises the sorts of jurisdictional 
issues discussed in Part VI. Such as , when users are in different countries and form a 
contract over the Internet where is a contract made? Furthermore, on the Internet often 
a formal legal contract will not exist but some other level of interaction between the 
parties will arise. 
Regardless of whether such perfectly formulated contracts exist there must still be 
adequate means of enforcing the contract and controlling the way information is used 
once it is released. 177 The individual will lose control of their information once it is 
made public. Even if the terms of the contract prohibit reuse outside of agreed purposes 
or retransmission of the information to third parties these terms would be difficult to 
enforce. 178 Therefore a contractual model is not a complete solution to privacy 
problems and an adequate privacy protection system will still need to be established. 
B. Legislation the European approach 
As demonstrated in the United States a sectoral legislative approach leads to large gaps 
where there is little or no privacy protection. In conjunction with various, largely 
ineffective, self-regulatory measures this leads to consumer confusion. Of more 
174 Reilly, above n 6, para 117. 
175 Trout-McIntyre, above n 142, 250. 
176 Lipinksi, above n 78. 
177 Lipinski, above n 78. 
178 Bel gum, above n l 0. 
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importance to companies that collect personal information is that consumers do not trust 
them 179 which actually inhibits the growth of e-commerce and the free flow of 
information. 
However, the failure of this sectoral approach is not fatal to the use of legislation. 
America· s patchwork approach is in marked contrast to the system in place in the EU, 
Canada, Australia, New Zealand and Hong Kong. In these countries omnibus data 
protection laws have been enacted that cover "the full spectrum of uses of personally 
identifiable information". 180 The state plays an active role in providing legislation and 
enforcement mechanisms. 
The European model is an example of a comprehensive legislative approach to privacy. 
The European Data Protection Directive 1995 (Directive) requires the introduction of 
statutory privacy controls. It obliges all member countries to adopt national laws 
incorporating its requirements and takes a rigorous approach to notice, consent, 
accuracy and access. 181 The implementation of these principles by the EU has been 
described as "fastidious and rigid" .182 
Through a wide definition of processing the Act regulates virtually anything which can 
be done with information, from collection to mere holding or destruction. 183 Web sites 
must tell users about what information is collected and allow users to refuse disclosure. 
Users have the right to access information held about them and the right to correct it. 
Users can refuse the sale or sharing of their personal data with online and offline 
• 18-1 A . compames. ppropnate exceptions are provided. Those involved in journalistic, 
literary or artistic activities in certain specified circumstances are exempted from most 
of the key provisions of the Act. 185 
The Directive presumes data processing is illegal unless certain conditions are met. The 
unambiguous consent of the data subject is one condition that can make processing 
179 Givens, above n 9, 350. 
180 Givens, above n 9. 348. 
181 Kurtz, above n 26, 173. Santha Rasaiah "Cun-ent Legislation, Privacy and the Media in the 
UK" ( 1998) 3(5) Communications Law 183, 184. 
182 Killingsworth, above n 68, 79. 
18
' Rasaiah, above n 181, I 84. 
184 Kurtz, above n 26, 173. 
185 These conditions are set out in section 32. see Rasaiah, above n 181, 184. 
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legitimate. 186 The idea of universal registration was replaced with details of processing 
carried out depending on the threat processing offers to the subject. The Act covers any 
information about an identifiable person, whether on computer or in a structured manual 
file, whether paper based or automated. Particularly tight conditions are imposed on 
processing certain types of sensitive data. 
The security requirement 1s flexible to allow for technological developments, the 
measure that must be taken must be appropriate to the risk presented and the nature of 
the data. There is a particular focus on the transfer of information to non-EU countries. 
Data can only be transferred to a country that ensures an adequate level of protection. 
187 
Adequacy is left undefined. On can be "relatively confident" that New Zealand's 
Privacy Act, for example, is adequate. 188 However the US has not been recognised as 
h . d . I ~ avmg a equate protect10n. 
The Directive must be enforced by a national regulatory body with statutory authority 
that has wide discretionary powers to implement more detailed restrictions. 
190 
Individuals in the EU countries also have a right of action; "every person has a right to a 
judicial remedy for any breach of the rights guaranteed to that person by the applicable 
national law". The aim is to empower citizens to take action against companies that 
misuse their data. Member states must provide appropriate sanctions. 
191 The EU also 
requires the availability of private money damages as a form of enforcement. 
Such a comprehensive legislative approach is required. What this legislative 
intervention provides is greater certainty and clarity than either a court based or self-
regulatory approach. A baseline of privacy protection must be provided via codification 
of fair information principles. 19 ~ Clear rules must be set out for individuals as to whether 
their information can be collected and what rights they have once it has been collected. 
This would enable individuals to identify breaches so as to exercise the available legal 
186 Data Protection Act 1998, s32. For a discussion of this exception see Rasaiah, above n 181 . 
187 There are exceptions, such as the unambiguous consent of the data subject. Noeding, above 
n38, 91. 
188 Discussion Paper No 12, above n 64, J J. 
189 Killingsworth, above n 68, 77. 
190 Rasaiah, above n 181, 183. 
191 Kurtz, above n 26, 173. 
192 Givens, above n 9, 355. 
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remedies. 193 Legislative backing is required to ensure sufficient coverage of the 
. d d "d f f . 19.j m ustry an prov1 e or en orcement sanct10ns. 
V. HARMONISATION 
"Incompatible national laws operating upon a single indivisible data flow can 
(could) only lead to inconvenience, disharmony, ineffective law and, in the 
end, the dominance of the laws of the most economically powerful 
• • d" • ,, 195 Juris ictions . · 
It has been argued that Data Protection Acts, such as the Directive, can not effectively 
address Internet privacy problems because they are unenforceable in that context. There 
are two reasons for these claims. Firstly, the Internet is global and information can be 
accessed and collected about individuals from anywhere in the world. The Internet is 
not based in one country or region, 196 nor is it owned or controlled by one governing 
body. 197 Secondly, data can easily be transferred from the protected country to "data 
havens··, places where no protection exists. 
It is true that due to the lack of geographical boundaries the ability of local laws to 
control privacy breaches is reduced. It is also true that there is currently no new 
international law or enforcement mechanism to protect privacy rights on the Internet. 
Despite this dissolution of boundaries, however, there is the potential, and indeed the 
necessity, to structure new boundaries. 198 This is necessary because the Internet is 
subjected to a myriad of legal regimes that make it easier for wrongdoers to avoid 
detection and prosecution and leads to legal uncertainty and confusion. Additionally if 
varying standards are in place and liability may arise in different jurisdictions forum 
shopping will occur - that is , the plaintiff will be able to choose to bring an action in the 
jurisdiction that is most amenable to the claim. 199 What is required is real international 
regulation that could ameliorate the inter-jurisdictional problems~00 and would prevent 
193 Chalton, above n 46, 7.3 
19
.i Preist, above n 67, 249. 
195 Hon Justice Micael Kirby "The Globalisation of Media and Judicial Independence·· ( 1996) 
1(3) Communications Law 115, 117. 
196 Davies, above n 3, 106. 
197 Bartlett, above n 139, 110. 
198 L. . ki b 78 1pms . a ove n . 
199 Davies. above n 3, 109: Bartlett, above n 139, 112. 
100 Kirby, above n 195. 
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countries from becoming homes for illegal activity.20
1 If there is no universal agreement 
there will be many data havens which might leak information back into the protected 
"0" country.- -
What form should this regulation take? What is required is a convention or treaty that 
addresses applicable law, regulation, jurisdiction, and enforcement to form a 
standardised environment.
2°' What is required is the process of harmonisation, 
conforming national laws to a basic international standard. Canada· s Information 
Highway Advisory Council has identified this need for bilateral and multilateral 
arrangements at the international level for Internet abuse.2~ Appropriate principles for 
Internet privacy protection must be agreed on at an international level. These principles 
would then be implemented in national legislation.2
05
• As in the EU it would be for the 
national law to determine whether an event is harmful provided that the effectiveness of 
the international agreement is not impaired.206 
It has been said that a drawback of harmonisation is that it is in essence the lowest 
common denominator to information access and control. It is true that a conciliatory 
and democratic approach may lead to an agreement that is emasculated and 
compromised. However, this will depend on the strength of those bargaining and the 
incentives that can be provided for agreeing to higher standards. 
Unless the language used is too general and ambiguous the principles could provide 
both guidance and flexibility. At a national level the use of broadly worded guiding 
principles has not been seen as fatal. The principles can provide guidelines as to 
acceptable conduct and provide a basic system that is consistent. In fact it is better to 
provide a framework of principles to apply to new technology rather than deal with each 
new technology as it arises by specific privacy laws.
207 In New Zealand there has not 
been a serious problem with the general principles of the Privacy Act.
208 The 
international agreement will be most useful if the international community treats it as 
201 Reilly, above n 6. 
202 Miller. above n 49, 146. 
203 Jeremy Landau "The Effect of Multi-Media Communication on Jurisdjctjon and Enforcement" 
(1996) 1 (2) Communications Law 58. 60. 
204 Tanya Schamach "Child Pornography in Cyberspace" (1996) 2 Appeal 58. 
205 Chalton, above n, 7.3 
206 Landau. above n 203. 
207 Privacy Commissioner Bruce Slane "Smart Cards. Privacy and Business Conference" ( 18 
October 1996, Sydney) I. 
208 Evans, above n 169, 193. 
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flexible and capable of occasional supplementation as issues require.2
09 
This avoids the 
criticism that legislation is too rigid to be practical. 
A. Is International Agreement Possible? 
I have concluded that it is necessary to move from the cunent ad hoe regime to a global 
legal and regulatory framework, but is this possible? A look at cunent systems 
governing the international regulation of data or the Internet provides guidance as to the 
ability of international consensus to be reached on effective information principles. 
In the context of general data information protection there appears to be some general 
consensus as to the principles involved. Many data protection statutes are based on the 
same principles. There are two international documents that establish the general 
informational privacy principles at an international level: the OECD Guidelines of 
1980210, the United Nations Guidelines of 1990. 
The basic data protection principles propounded in the OECD guidelines and the 
Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of 
Personal Data 1980 have influenced, and sometimes precipitated, much of the 
legislation enacted since 1981 in a number of countries, including Australia and New 
Zealand? 1 The OECD has also been able to develop new principles under its 
guidelines for the new Internet environment, for example on the security of information 
systems and encryption principles.2 12 For example, in 1998 the OECD adopted the 
Protection of Privacy of Global Networks declaration. 
The intent is that countries will be assisted in developing policies and regulations and to 
give guidance on core characteristics to business and consumer groups and self-
regulatory bodies. Non-member countries are invited to take account of these 
"
09 David Harland "The Consumer in the Globalised Information Society - the impact of the 
international organisations" ( 1999) CCLJ Lexis I 0, 15, 33-34. 
21 0 All twenty-four OECD member countries have adopted these guidelines. However, different 
forms of implementation have been utilised: thirteen countries have comprehensive data 
protection legislation covering both the public and the p1ivate sector, other countries such as 
Australia, Canada, Japan and the US only have Jaws relating to certain sectors; some have enacted 
no laws at all, such as Belgium, Greece, Italy, Switzerland and Turkey. Tucker, above n 59, 68. 
011 Kib b - r y, a oven 195,117; Tucker, above n 59, 69. 
212 Cryptography Policy ( 1997) and on Consumer Protection in electronic commerce ( 1998); 
Noeding, 92; Discussion Paper No 12, above n 64. 
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guidelines due to the OECD's limited membership.
113 Consensus and a common 
approach to assure individual control was arrived at which influenced domestic laws.
214 
In regards to Europe there is also the Council of European Data Protection Convention 
of 1981 and the supra-national instrument the European Union Framework Data 
Protection Directive.2 15 The substance is similar in all of these instruments, although 
the Directive 95/46/EC elaborates these principles in greater detail. These principles 
are discussed below. 
What this illustrates is that agreement is possible. There are further precedents for 
international treaties covering areas that are relevant, such as the Berne Convention and 
the GA TTSffRIPs agreement. If the EU could come to a consensus, for example 
between Germany with its stricter privacy protection and England with its historical 
lack of protection, then this provides hope that such an agreement could be reached 
between other countries.2 16 
Who might be responsible for developing these principles? While there are various 
possibilities the organisation that is probably best placed is the OECD. The OECD is an 
international regulator that might take the lead in formulating international 
homogeneous legislation, and might perhaps become a supervisory body. If adequate 
OECD principles were adopted this could lead to a degree of harmonisation of laws, as 
well as to effective international self-regulatory schemes and dispute resolution.
217 
The United States continues to dominate the Internet therefore their cooperation in any 
data protection initiative is essential. Hope is provided as the privacy protection 
principles advocated by the FTC are not that different, though less strict, than those of 
the EU. As concerns over privacy increase Congress and the President have become 
increasingly willing to push for the industry to adopt stronger measures.
21 8 
Even 
without the cooperation of the US those that sign the agreement could lead the way in 
privacy protection with the hope that others will follow. 
213 Harland, above n 209, 45. 
214 Kirby, above n 195, I 17. 
215 There are twelve member countries. 
216 Flaherty, above n 37,230. 
21 7 Harland, above n 209, 45. 
218 Sinrod and Jolish, above n I. 
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It is acknowledged, however, that a complete harmonisation of laws is virtually 
impossible. Therefore the EU restrictive transfer provision might provide a way for 
individual nations or regional blocs to enhance privacy. Under the Council of European 
Convention Issued Reconunendations 1991 the Directive· s transfer restriction applies 
unless necessary measures have been taken to respect the principles. For example, 
contractual measures reflecting the principles with the data subject having the 
opportunity to object, or obtaining the data subject's free and informed consent in 
writing.2 19 Most laws based on the OECD guidelines do not have such a restriction.2
20 
Unless countries with insufficient legislation can prove that companies can voluntarily 
protect the data as required by EU" s data protection laws even major multinationals 
could be banned from routine business transactions.:!:!t If a list of jurisdictions that had 
adequate protection were compiled this would ease compliance and administrative 
costs.:!22 What the Directive proves is that while a country might not be able to regulate 
what happens outside its jurisdiction it can control what information leaves its 
boundaries and enforce its rulings on those within its geographical borders. 
B. The Principles 
The principles that are at the basis of so many agreements are broadly that personal data 
shall be: processed (which includes collected) lawfully and fairly; only obtained for 
specified and lawful purposes with consent and not further processed incompatibly with 
those specified purposes; adequate relevant and not excessive for their purpose; 
accurate and if necessary up-to-date; not kept for longer than is required; processed in 
accordance with the rights of data subjects; provided with security measures against 
unauthorised or unlawful processing. Within the EU there is the additional principle 
that data can not be transferred outside the European Economic Area without an 
adequate level of protection for the rights of data subjects.
223 Underlying these 
principles is the idea of transparency, provided through consent and notice. 
224 These 
more stringent EU requirements should be favoured over the FfC requirements. 
"
19 Seminerio, above n 123. 
"'1"'1Q • • 
-- D1scuss10n Paper No 12. above n 64. 
""
1 Seminerio, above n 123. 
""" Discussion Paper No 12. above n 64. 
""
1 This helpful sunm1ary was provided by Aldhouse, above n 7, 9. 
""
4 Schnaitman, above n 107. 
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This basic outline is clearly incomplete and many details would need to be worked out. 
For example, if information is held about an individual within a country, even if they do 
not reside there, that individual should have rights to access, perhaps with a reasonable 
charge imposed in appropriate circumstances.2
25 Further, the identity of the information 
collector is not always simple, often the entity for whom the site ultimately collects the 
data is not revealed. 226 The website should therefore be required to display who it is 
collecting information for. Companies should also be required to conduct privacy 
impact assessments on their products and services in the development stage. 
227 
Appropriate exceptions would obviously have to be included. 
When these principles are formulated those involved must be careful to ensure that both 
the information rich and poor are considered and that the national or commercial 
interests of one population segment don not supersede citizens· collective rights.
228 
What would be required is both consumer and industry input. Consultation must occur 
with appropriate industry groups such as the World Wide Web Conso1tium (W3C). The 
W3C is ideally suited as a non-profit organisation that sponsors committees that look at 
Internet problems and attempt to determine solutions.
229 
1. Collection 
The purpose of this essay is not to provide comprehensive principles. However the 
principles relating to collection will be explored in more depth. This is because, as 
noted above, collection is the stage most amenable to regulation and is overlooked by 
most commentators. The approach adopted is that advocated by Cavoukin and Tapscott, 
who believe in stringent safeguarding of personal information from the outset.
230 As 
previously mentioned, what is required is meaningful and informed consent to 
information collection. The EU requires that the subject has "unambiguously given his 
or her consent"231 and Quebec requires that consent should be free, enlightened and 
given for specific purposes. The consent is only valid for the time needed to achieve the 
'1' purposes assented to.-· -
225 Privacy Commissioner A Guide to the Privacy Act 1993 - Discussion Paper Number 3 
(Auckland, I July 1993). 
226 Belgum, above n I 0. 
227 Givens, above n 9, 355 
228 Lipinski, above n 78. 
229 Noeding, above n 32, 92. 
230 Reilly, above n 6. 
231 European Union Directive on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of 
Personal Data and on the Free Movement of such Data, 24 October I 995. Article 7(a). 
232 ;<Protection of Personal Information in the Private Sector I 993" sl4 (Quebec Act). 
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If consent is to be meaningful and real choice is to be given to the consumer the choices 
must be easy to make and the consumer must be adequately informed as to the 
availability of the choice and its implications. The Hong Kong Personal Data (Privacy) 
Ordinance 1995 includes the following principle that should be implemented: 
"Information to be generally available 
All practicable steps shall be taken to ensure that a person can: 
(a) ascertain a data user· s policies and practices in relation to personal data; 
(b) be informed of the kind of personal data held by a data user; 
(c) be informed of the main purposes for which data held by a data user are or 
are to be used. "233 
Limits should not, however, purely be implemented at the point of data collection from 
the individual but should extend to data obtained from public records and third party 
sources. 
The Hong Kong section applies to information that is not collected directly from the 
individual and generally requires agencies to be open about their data policies and 
practices. The principle should not be linked to collection as much information is 
indirectly acquired. This not only gives the user choice but also facilitates access and 
correction.234 As in New Zealand, information should only be collected for a lawful 
purpose connected with the function of the agency.
235 
2. A differing standard for sensitive information? 
Some data categories might be regarded as more sensitive than others and therefore 
deserving of differing protection. The EU Directive requires additional safeguards for 
sensitive information.236 Certain data must be subject to opt-in clauses, such as that 
relating to religious and political affiliations and medical conditions. For all other 
personal information there must be an opt-out clause. 
Is this an appropriate distinction? I would argue that, at least on an international level, 
it is not. Sensitive information is hard to define and varies with different cultural 
:m Schedule I, principle 5. Noted in Discussion Paper No 12, above n 64. 
234 These are some of the benefits listed in the Australian Privacy Charter in regards to their 
openness principle. 
215 Agency includes any person, company, or government department, with some important 
exceptions. 
236 Article 8. 
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settings. Such measures would need to be at the discretion of each jurisdiction. 
Importantly, there is the risk that sensitive categories might be emphasised to the 
detriment of good information practices generally. The system might also become more 
complicated leading to increased administrative and compliance costs.
237 
To avoid confusing distinctions all information should be subject to opt-in clauses. This 
would give individuals greater control over the use of their information.2
38 As noted, the 
problem with these opt-in provisions is that they do not fit well with covertly obtained 
information. What must be addressed is the collection of information not just via active 
means but also through passive means, such as cookies. If such covert means are used 
this should be noted and a link should be provided to a page that provides instructions 
for disabling the means of collection. 
While the information that must be provided may appear onerous it is possible for Web 
sites to develop and display, for example, standardised logos which would indicate what 
sort of privacy protection is provided and who can obtain the user· s personal 
information.239 In the model advocated below the Privacy Commissioner could develop 
these logos. If collectors displayed these logos but did not follow the measures they 
stand for enforcement action could follow. 
It has been said by the Direct Marketing Association that these provisions would be 
"death to us ... If you can't use information about a person without permission, that 
11 . . h 1 · f b " '
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genera y means you re not gomg to ave a 1st o great su stance .- However, 
individuals have a right to control information about themselves. Information collectors 
are profiting from users' information and therefore should take on responsibilities. 
Marketers receive direct benefits while at best consumers only receive indirect benefits 
in the form of services that are targeted to their tastes. Opt-in clauses would not kill the 
marketing industry, rather marketers and information collectors would have to provide 
incentives for information provision. These incentives could include reduced rates, free 
services, or promotions to those willing to provide their information. 
237 Discussion Paper No 12, above n 64, 16. 
m David J Klein "Keeping Business Out of the Bedroom: protecting personal privacy interests 
from the retail world" ( 1997) 15 Journal of Computer and Information Law 391, 408. 
~
39 Effross. above n 84. 
240 Robert S Greenberger, Mass Marketers Say High Court Ruling Will Boost Costs, Mean More 
Junk Mail, Wall Sreet Journal, Jan 18, 2000 at B8. 
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These incentive systems must, however, allow for real consumer choice. If those who 
do not provide the information can not use the service that essentially negates any 
consent that might be given. The proposed Canadian Charter contains a right that has 
no equivalent in the New Zealand Privacy Act, it provides that there is a "duty not to 
disadvantage people because they elect to exercise their rights to privacy".
241 
What 
needs to be recognised is that the individual has the right to decide whether or not to 
release their information and how that information should be used, not the data 
collector. Maybe an ISP could offer two prices, with a higher one for those who refuse 
to release their information.
242 
Allowing for the user to remain anonymous, if they choose, is important. Using Internet 
services on an anonymous basis may be the most effective means of preserving privacy. 
The right to anonymity has been recommended by the House of Commons in Canada
24
\ 
and has been included in the US National Infrastructure principles
244 
and the Australian 
Privacy Charte/45 . This right has been limited by phrases such as remaining 
anonymous "when appropriate" and identifying individuals only if it is "reasonably 
justified". 
It must be borne in mind that only personally identifiable information is restricted. 
Statistics, for example, of how many people visit a certain website or buy a certain 
product that are not linked to an individual are perfectly acceptable. Furthermore, 
broadly speaking, the purposes for which information is collected can be broadened or 
narrowed, as long as the user is adequately informed, has a real choice and consents 
thereby forming a contract. 
241 Recommendation 2, clause 5.1 
242 Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss "Wan-en and Brandeis Redux: finding (more) privacy protection in 
intellectual property law" (I 999) Stand Tech L Rev 8, 27. 
243 "Everyone is entitled to expect and enjoy anonymity, unless the need to identify 
individuals is reasonably justified.'' 
Repo11 of the House of Commons Standing Committee on Human Rights and the Status of 
Persons with Disabilities, Privacy: where do we draw the line ?, Ottawa, April 1997, 
recommendation 2. 
"Empowem1ent principle 
Individuals should be able to safeguard their own privacy by having ... the opportunity to 
remain anonymous where appropriate." 
Privacy Working Group Information Policy Committee Information Infrastructure Taskforce, 
"Privacy and the National Infrastructure: principles for providing and using personal 
info1111ation", 6 June 1995. 
245 "Anonymous transactions 
People should have the option of not identifying themselves when ente1ing transactions." 
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C. Are there Sufficient Incentives for such a Harmonised System to Become a 
Reality? 
Initiatives such as those taken by Europe and the OECD are the only way forward to 
prevent the loss of informational privacy on the net.
246 However, the failure of the EU 
and the US to reach agreement despite extensive negotiations and the threat of data 
restrictions indicates the difficulty of trying to establish a harmonised system. 
Harmonisation clearly provides benefits for consumers but are there sufficient 
incentives for the state to implement such a unified system? 
At the moment Internet developments are occurring virtually outside of government 
regulation thereby depriving the state of autonomy in this area. The state's ability to 
control data collection is exacerbated by the global nature and ephemeral nature of the 
Internet, and the problems this leads to for national enforcement. States may be more 
likely to compromise their sovereignty than to altogether lose any semblance of 
control.247 Pressure from consumers and their advocate groups might also have an 
impact. As time progresses, with more people using the Internet and instances of 
privacy breaches becoming more apparent, pressure will probably increase. 
Under harmonisation the current confusing array of statutes, common law, and self-
regulatory measures can be avoided. One of the advantages of harmonisation is that it 
provides fairness. Similar acts in different places will produce similar results. If a 
uniform system were implemented Internet data collectors and service providers would 
have clear guidelines to operate by. If they complied with the relevant Jaws would not 
be held liable. 
From a purely commercial viewpoint there are sufficient benefits to the government, 
and the industry, to become involved in a harmonised system. Universal fairness is 
economically efficient.2'-18 With uniform regulation the simplicity of businesses 
operating across jurisdictions and assuring with compliance will decrease costs.
249 A 
major benefit is that personal data in identifiable form and for commercial purposes can 
be moved between signatory countries without any form of privacy protection scrutiny 
246 Harland, above n 209. 33-34. 
~
47 Harland, above n 209, 21. 
248 Lipinksi. above n 78. 
249 David Ken "The Case for Regulation" Guardian Unlimited 20 April 2000 at 
<http://www. huardian unlimited.co. u.k/freespeech/artic le/0,27 63 .21 24 7 4.00. html>. 
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because each of the members have equivalent, comparable privacy protection.
250 
This 
eliminates the transaction cost of negotiating agreements between information sellers 
and buyers in countries that comply. A harmonised approach also facilitates access as 
some producers are reluctant to offer their information products and services to citizens 
in countries that have not adopted adequate protection.
25 1 
The biggest incentive is probably that "the country that best updates its legal framework 
to facilitate e-commerce will gain a comparative economic advantage".
252 
If system 
administrators worldwide had to work to ensure the security and integrity of their 
systems consumer confidence would increase and more online business would be 
obtained. There is a larger likelihood that users engage in electronic commerce. In 
contrast to this a lack of harmonisation and the consequential fear of a milieu of 
divergent policies may inhibit the growth of the Internet and in particular e-commerce. 
While this has not been a noticeable problem so far as more divergent legislation is 
enacted and courses of action are established the risk is increasing.
253 
Industry and 
Government both therefore have a vested interest in providing for safe trading. 
Data restriction provisions could also provide incentives to the harmonisation of law, 
they are not restricted to achieving mere diplomatic pressure
254 The importance of the 
EU in international trade has caused countries to revisit, and revise, their laws. 
Countries with consistent legislation could form blocks of power made up of those with 
consistent legislation. These large blocks could then place pressure on smaller blocks 
or states to try and force them to comply. 
Under a harmonised system with a data transfer restriction if a country does not have 
adequate legislation transfer should not necessarily be barred to the entire country. 
Transfer might be acceptable if a data collecting company has internal rules that are 
deemed to be adequate. This would enable the flow of information to remain 
unimpeded. This determination could be funded at the company's expense, as they will 
250 Flaherty, above n 37 , 229-230. 
251 Lipinski, above n 78. The OECD has recognised that "domestic legislation concerning privacy 
protection .. . may hinder informational (data) flows" and has therefore encouraged compatible 
laws. Discussion Paper No 12, above n 64. 
252 Power, above n 8, 235 . 
253 Power, above n 8, 236. 
25
.i According to Chalton the best the EU can hope to achieve is placing diplomatic pressure on 
those countries whose infomrntion privacy laws are inadequate, above n 46, 7.6 
1 
J 
y 
45 
obtain the benefit. The extra cost to the industry should also cause the companies to 
place pressure on non-signatory governments to become part of the agreement. 
D. An Alternative Solution 
Harland advocates the development of non-binding guidelines or codes, together with 
various modes of international cooperation. While these codes would not be legally 
binding under international law Harland believes they have important consequences and 
may come to be "soft law". That is they would put considerable pressure on 
governments and businesses and influence the way business is done. They might also 
affect the development of legislation, the application of existing law, and the form of 
government policy?55 Non-binding guidelines can assist countries in providing a privacy 
protection framework. They might also stimulate further international cooperation. 
The moral force of the guidelines might raise sensitivity over privacy issues.
256 For 
example, the work of the UN Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) 
has been influential in the e-commerce area. UNCITRAL's Model Law on Electronic 
Commerce ( 1996) is designed to provide internationally accepted principles on issues 
regarding paperless communications where there is present uncertainty. This model has 
influenced Australian and Singaporean legislation?57 The UN Guidelines also 
encourage regional cooperation as a way forward, such as via the Asia-Pacific 
Economic Cooperation, and like that found in the EU. 
I believe that due to the potential of the Internet to seriously erode privacy rights what is 
required is not merely soft law, therefore this option is less preferable to harmonisation. 
As is clear from the discussion in Part ill industry initiatives are insufficient. My view 
is that effective solutions can only be provided via a legislative system that provides for 
an adequate enforcement system. This would provide the substantially greater incentives 
needed to spur self-regulation and ensure widespread implementation of privacy 
principles. 258 
255 Harland, above n 209, 25-26. 
256 Harland, above n 209. 33-34. 
257 Harland. above n 209, 42. 
258 Maitha K Landesberg et al "Federal Trade Commission: report to Congress on privacy online" 
Part VB3 at <http://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy3/survey.htm#GeneralSurveyFindings>. 
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However, it is accepted that a coordinated response could take some time.2
59 
While 
major international organisations such as the OECD are in the process of seriously 
discussing cooperative schemes, for a variety of reasons there are many countries who 
do not feel the same sense of urgency to combat privacy invasions. This is particularly 
so for those countries with more pressing social problems to deal with.
260 
The processing of data will tend to migrate to the countries that have the weakest 
protection.261 In a financial context experience has shown that when physical location is 
no longer important, organisations a.re inclined to move to the jurisdictions that have the 
f l 1 
. "6" 
most avoura.b e regu a.tory regimes.- - Therefore "weak protection" can equate to 
increased revenue. For example, currently data processors would be more likely to 
conduct business in the US than the UK that, as noted, has stricter controls in place. 
This will act as a disincentive, in particular to developing countries. Developing 
countries are understandably reluctant to endorse guidelines that might restrict industrial 
development, unless they a.re offered some guarantee of technological or financial 
"6' support. - ·' 
A "soft law" approach, while not a solution, is better than no law and if it is the only 
available option should be vigorously pursued. As legally binding international 
standards might be a long way off the development of international standards that a.re 
endorsed by Government, industry, and consumers is a way to make progress.26-1 
Whatever means is ultimately adopted "the world of individual national jurisdictions 
will need to address the increasingly borderless crimes committed in cyberspace".2
65 
VI. FURTHER PROBLEMS 
A. Jurisdiction 
259 Schamach. above n 204, 64. 
260 Simod and Reilly, above n 35, 30. 
261 Chalton, above n 46, 7 .6. 
"6" - - Ian W Hutton "Electronic Cash - welcome to the future" (1995) 145 no 6273 New Law Journal 
1810. 
263 Harland, above n 209, 37. 
264 Harland, above n 209, 15. 
265 Simod, above n 30, 2'.?.9. 
47 
Complicating privacy violation enforcement is the area of legal jurisdiction. As noted 
global distribution is an inevitable, and central, feature of the Internet. 266 The resulting 
situation poses a complex jurisdictional question, in the case of a multi-jurisdictional 
dispute which jurisdiction should the dispute be heard in? A further, and equally 
complex question, is which law should apply? These issues are not new but these 
problems are exacerbated on the Internet because more formal and informal 
relationships can be quickly created across many different jurisdictions. Issues relating 
to jurisdiction and applicable law were major obstacles for the agreement sought 
between the EU and the US. 267 
1. Which country has jurisdiction? 
With something as ephemeral as the Internet, and because of the transitory nature of 
websites, it is often hard to determine which country should have jurisdiction.268 What 
is required is "an agreement on the cooperation of the enforcement of judgements, so 
that no state takes (took) exception to an attempt by another state to exert its law of 
extra-territoriality".269 Ideally in a harmonised system there would be an international 
supervisory body that would have jurisdictional competence to govern jurisdictional 
disputes as to which country has the authority to deal with a complaint. 
Even if such a system was agreed to the practical matter of which forum should settle 
the dispute will still need to be resolved, whether a privacy agency, international body, 
or court is involved. The extension of one country's jurisdiction to another must have a 
reasonable legal basis.270 Therefore an acceptable test will have to be developed. 
However, the practical effects of this decision would be reduced if the laws in the 
jurisdictions concerned were substantively similar. 
Courts are currently prepared to assert their jurisdiction over those operating in other 
countries. The following French example illustrates this point. The Yahoo case, 
decided this year, dealt with jurisdiction for the purpose of online auctions. The case 
266 Nick Braithwaite 'The Internet and Bulletin Board Defamation" (1995) New Law Journal 
1216. 
267 Harland, above n 209, 45. 
268 Kirby, above n 195, 117. Michael L Siegel "Online Information Provider Liability for 
Copyright Infringement: Potential Pitfalls and Solutions" (1999) 4 Virginia Journal of Law and 
Technology 7, para 9. 
269 Landau, above n 203, 60. 
no Lipinski , above n 78. 
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involved a complaint by a French Jewish students group against Yahoo!Inc and Yahoo 
France. The Yahoo!Inc site contained an online auction site which exhibited for sale 
more than one thousand items of Nazi memorabilia and hosted the Geocities.com site 
which had anti-Semitic sites. Yahoo.corn itself did not contain the offfensive content 
but links to sites that contained the material. Yahoo France provided a hypertext link to 
Yahoo.com.
27 1 
The court held in relation to Yahoo!Inc that the viewing of illicit content by French 
websurfers on their computer screens constituted a harm felt in France and that this was 
sufficient to establish jurisdiction. Jurisdiction was allowed because the activity caused 
harm to people or organisations in France. This is the first time such meagre grounds 
have been used to establish jurisdiction. 
272 
Clearly an adequate solution must be reached to enable clarity and certainty, as well as 
reasonable results. Currently tests vary between property, tort, and contract claims. For 
example, under Article 2 of the Brussels Convention,
273 a plaintiff must issue 
proceedings against an EC defendant in the courts of the state where the defendant is 
domiciled. However this rule does not apply to tort in which case the action might be 
bought against the plaintiff in the place where the harmful event occurred.
274 
There are also many different tests between, and within, different countries. What are 
some of these different approaches? Firstly, jurisdiction could be restricted to the place 
where the plaintiff is bringing the action. Consumers Internationaf
75 and Japan's 
Economic Conunerce Promotion Council have argued that the consumer's country of 
residence must be recognised. Another option is the defendant's jurisdiction. Again in 
the advertising arena the US has advocated the defendant's country of origin rule. This 
rule has been adopted by the International Chamber of Commerce in its Revised 
Guidelines on Advertising and Marketing on the Internet.2
76 
27 1 Sales Vincent & Associes "Imp011ant Rulings on Online Auctions" International Law Office 
June 29 2000 at <http://www.internationallawoffice.com/ld.cfm?Newsletters_Ref=l 924>. 
272 Sales Vincent, above n 271. 
m On Jurisdiction and the Enforcement and Recognition of Judgements in Civil and Commercial 
Matters 1968. 
274 Article 5(3) of the Brussels Convention. 
275 Fom1erly known as the International Organisation of Consumers Unions. 
276 Harland, above n 209, 30. 
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In America one test that has been adopted is the "totality of contacts" approach. This 
requires the court to gather and weigh all contacts that the defendant has with the forum, 
either electronic or non-electronic, to determine whether the contact is sufficient to 
assert jurisdiction.277 Furthermore the place where the effects of the action are felt the 
most might be the appropriate forum. This is another prominent approach in the US.
278 
However this "effects doctrine" has not been accepted either by the English courts or 
the European Court of Justice, although the European Commission has accepted it.
279 
On approach that is not practicable for the Internet context is provided in the EU under 
the Berne Convention. Following this approach if the harm occurs in more than one 
place actions may be bought in all those places. Due to potential for a wide distribution 
of information causing the breach makes it possible for harm, and therefore liability, to 
arise in various jurisdictions. This would clearly be advantageous to the plaintiff but 
hugely expensive and cumbersome for the defendant.
280 
The Internet throws all of these standard tests for asserting jurisdiction out of kilter. 
They are complex and difficult to apply. Judicial responses have been unpredictable.
28 1 
For example, some courts have found that the creation of a website is enough to 
establish jurisdiction.282 Others have held that if a passive website invited visitors to 
contact via e-mail that was sufficient. 28
3 With differing standards in place, forum 
shopping will occur. To obtain consistency it might be beneficial to treat the Internet as 
a special category. While an appropriate test must be formulated I have not attempted 
to resolve this issue. 
2. Which law should apply? 
If the laws do not conflict, the court will typically apply the substantive law of the 
forum state. What happens if the laws do conflict? Unless there is complete 
harmonisation, an outcome that is highly unlikely, this issue is bound to arise. 
177 Barry J Waldman "A Unified Approach to Cyber-Libel: defamation on the Internet, a 
suggested approach" ( 1999) 6 Rich JL & Tech 6. 
m Waldman, above n 277. 
279 Landau, above n 203. 60. 
280 Landau, above n 203, 60. 
281 Lipinski, above n 78. 
282 Inset Systems Inc 11 Instruction Set, Co 937 F.Supp 161 ( 1996). Desktops Techs Inc 1• 
Colonvorks Reprod & Design Inc, NO CIV !98-5029, 1999 WL 98572, 4 (ED Pa Feb 25 1999). 
283 Jntemational Star Registry of America v Bowman-Haight Ventures Inc, No 98 C 6823, 1999 
WL 300285 at 607 (ND ILL May 6, 1999). 
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Following a general tort-based approach, first it must be determined which states have 
an interest in the application of their law. The court will then have regard to various 
factors. These are which state has the greatest interest in having its law applied, the 
relevant policies of the forum, certainty and predictability in the results reached, ease in 
the application of the law, the promotion of interstate order and policy considerations. 
Under the traditional multi-state defamation approach the state with the most significant 
relationship to the conduct will have its law applied, which will usually be the state in 
which the claimant was domiciled if that was where "publication'' occurred.284 
In the context of defamation Waldman believes the best point to begin is the domicile of 
the claimant. If the greatest effect of the breach is not in the plaintiffs jurisdiction then 
a secondary test must apply. This would focus on the location of where the greatest 
demonstrable injury has been caused, not whether the defendant knew that his or her 
actions would have an impact in that forum. 285 Whatever approach is adopted the 
appropriate solution must not be too complex, a contact by contact analysis would take 
time and money. 
B. When should Internet Service Providers be Vicariously Liable? 
A further, and equally challenging obstacle, is determining when ISPs should be 
vicariously liable for the actions of those using their networks. Here we are not 
concerned with the circumstances in which an ISP should be held liable when they have 
directly breached an individual's privacy, but when messages or information that are 
invasive of privacy is posted on its network. Local publication is only possible in an 
area via an ISP. ISPs are therefore in the best position to monitor abuse and protect the 
privacy rights of those on the net. Add to this the potential anonymity of the person 
breaching privacy, and the possible evidential problems of establishing which person 
sent the information,286 and it becomes clear that it is necessary to hold ISPs 
accountable in some situations. 
The question 1s when. For example, should a service provider be liable for the 
establishment of a link to another web site for violations made on that site? Should the 
284 Waldman, above n 277. 
285 Waldman, above n 277. 
286 Braithwaite, above n 266, 1216. 
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ISP have to review all content on that other site before providing a link, and carry out 
subsequent checks? Should a provider be liable if they receive actual notice there is a 
link to an infringing site? Any international agreement would have to deal with this 
difficult issue. 
In the French Yahoo case mentioned already Yahoo France was found to have a duty to 
· warn each and every user of the dangers of clicking on a link, despite the infringing 
information being at least two hypertext links away, to a site that it knows has illicit 
content. The penalties imposed were unprecedented. Yahoo!Inc had to block access to 
the illicit sites by French Internet users and also to block all access to incriminated sites. 
The court held that technical difficulties limiting access to Nazi propaganda on its 
system were not insurmountable and ordered Yahoo to take all necessary measures to 
discourage and render impossible any access via Yahoo to auctions of Nazi 
memorabilia.287 Is this an appropriate result? 
I would argue it is not, due to the vast amount of information placed on the network 
daily and the ability of users to place information on, for example, bulletin boards. 
Service providers have far less opportunity than traditional information providers to 
review content.288 If strict liability were enforced then censorship in the form of 
monitoring transmissions would occur.2
89 Additionally it is usually not immediately 
apparent to the provider that any privacy laws have been breached, unless a complaint is 
received. 
The amount of control an ISP has over the information should be made determinative. 
At one end of the scale is where the provider determines the content of the messages 
and disseminates them, at the other end is the provider of a bulletin board for the private 
distribution of information.290 This is the approach taken in the defamation context 
which provides various "innocent dissemination" defences to try and limit ISP liability. 
In Britain, under the Defamation Act 1996, those with only secondary responsibility for 
the publication of defamatory material (including ISPs) escape liability if they are not 
287 Sales Vincent. above n 271. 
288 Davies, above n 3, 10. 
289 These arguments were noted in relation to copyright infringement but are equally applicable to 
breaches of privacy. Irina Y Dmitrieva "I Know it When I See it: should Internet Providers 
recognize copyright violation when they see it?" (May, 2000) 16 Computer & High Tech 1J 233 , 
237-8. 
290 Bartlett, above n 139, 111. 
52 
the author, editor, or publisher of the allegation. This would not protect an ISP who 
deliberately published the information.29 1 Similarly in New Zealand a recent Law 
Commission report has suggested that an ISP should only be liable for republishing 
defamatory statements if it had actual knowledge of the material, and therefore 
control.292 The current NZ Defamation Act provides a defence to distributors, but the 
application of this to ISPs has yet to be tested in court. 
It has been argued that introducing such a knowledge or control requirement encourages 
providers to turn a blind eye to privacy violations and to refrain from offering any form 
of control. Despite this criticism it seems reasonable that if having taken all reasonable 
care an ISP did not know, or have reason to know, the information was breaching 
privacy then liability should not be incurred. If they were required to control or have 
knowledge of Internet content this would not only increase legal risks but also increase 
the cost of supervision which could stunt the growth of the information 
h. h 091 super 1g way.- · 
A good approach to ISP liability that should be adapted for the privacy protection 
context is provided in the Online Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation Act 1998 
(OCILLA) US. Under this Act service providers are not liable for most forms of relief 
for copyright violations if they fall into a number of safe harbours. If the ISP is carrying 
out certain passive functions liability is limited.294 Graduated liability is provided as 
ISP involvement increases. To be eligible for liability limitations the ISP must 
designate an agent to receive notification295 of copyright violations and must implement 
a policy for the termination of accounts of subscribers who repeatedly violate copyright. 
An ISP must also remove material that is claimed to be infringing upon notification 
from the copyright owner. Once notification is received the ISP must take down the 
allegedly infringing information. This would help avoid situations arising like those in 
the Demon case. Earlier this year Demon Internet paid more than £230,000 in damages 
~
91 Amber Melville-Brown et al ''Reform at Last in Defamation Law after Centuries of Little 
Change. and Points of Future Trends" (2000) 97(7) Law Society"s Gazette 24. 
292 Bell Gully, above n 162. 
293 Angel, above n 24, 113. 
294 
Under this definition they must not initiate, select or modify communication content, 
determine the message recipients or retain a copy on a system or network longer than is necessary 
for the transmission if that system or network is ordinarily accessible to other people. Remaining 
passive includes the mere provision of e-mail services, newsgroups, and listserv services. 
s512(a)(l-5). 
295 The requirements and procedures for notification are provided for in section 512. 
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and fees to end a court action by an academic, Laurence Godfrey, who said he was 
defamed by two anonymous Internet postings. Godfrey had asked the ISP to remove the 
posting but the ISP refused.2
96 The statute also allows for counter-notification, to allow 
for fairness and balance. A user can argue, under the threat of perjury, that the material 
was removed due to a mistake or a misidentification.
297 
The purpose of the Act is to provide certainty and enforcement but also to allow for the 
development of networks and avoid censorship. Copyright owners are given primary 
responsibility for the enforcement of their rights because they are in the best position to 
make well-informed judgments as to what constitutes a violation. This is the same for 
privacy. Generally, only the individual involved will know whether the information was 
consented to or was used in breach of privacy.
298 This approach seems to effectively 
balance the need for ISP" s to take responsibility for information that breaches the 
principles while ensuring that internet growth is not stunted or that censorship does not 
occur. 
What must be avoided is an approach that unfairly favours either the ISP or the 
claimant. For example, a complete shield from an action unless the service was the 
actual author of the content should not be implemented. Such an approach was adopted 
in the defamation context in the US in the Communications Decency Act 1996. 
299 
Under this Act even contract employees of service providers have been held to be third 
paities thereby removing the ISP from the equation. Liability is only incurred if a 
person is a direct employee of the ISP . 
300 The effect has been to protect ISPs from 
liability even where they retain editorial control. This removes the incentives for 
ensuring that offending material is not disseminated or is promptly removed. Innocent 
parties might be without compensation.
301 
296 Patrick Barkham "Internet Regulation 'a threat to civil libe1ties· GuardianUnlimited Special 
Report May 3 2000 at 
<http: //www.guardianunlimitccl.co.uk/freespeech/article/0,2763,216809,00.html>. 
297 Dmitrieva, above n 289. 
298 Dmitrieva, above n 289, 261. 
299 The Act provides that "no provider or u er of any interactive computer service shall be treated 
as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another infornrntion content provider··. 
230( c)(2)(A)-(B) 
300 Matt Dmdge published a report via e-mail and received a flat monthly $3000 fee for providing 
his publication to AOL customers. AOL reserved the right to modify the content of the report. 
Dmdge printed defamatory information about a man claiming he had a history of domestic 
violence against his wife. This connection was not held sufficient to remove Drudge from the 
third party category. 
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The problem with this has been made blatantly obvious by the Kenneth Zeran case.
302 
A posting on an AOL bulletin board advertised that Zeran was selling T-shirts that were 
making jest at the Oklahoma City Federal Building Bombing - as a result he received 
angry and derogatory calls as well as death threats. Zeran bought a defamation action 
after he claimed AOL had taken an unreasonable time to remove defamatory messages 
and failure to post a retraction after Zeran had notified the provider of their existence. 
The court held that ISPs were not liable for information originating from third parties 
and failure to exercise "editorial control" was not a basis for recovery, thereby limiting 
Zeran' s claim to the original author. 
Piercing anonymity 
In order to bring an action for breach of privacy against a user it is sometimes necessary 
for ISPs to disclose the identity of the user or to trace their activities. Contrary to 
popular belief even where individuals take privacy precautions it is generally possible to 
establish where the information originated from by means of the IP address.303 
Unfortunately, obtaining such information can itself be a breach of an individual's 
privacy. Reflecting on the example at the start of the paper, McVeigh had his privacy 
breached when AOL identified him, despite the Navy remaining unidentified and not 
possessing a warrant. Last year a Canadian Court ruled that ISPs can be ordered to 
reveal the identity of their users, despite the fact that the service providers had not been 
joined in the proceedings.304 
The international agreement must explicitly outline situations in which such information 
may be obtained and it must provide procedural safeguards. 305 In the US the Electronic 
301 Waldman, above n 277 . 
302 'Zeran v America Online Inc 129 F3d 327 (4tl' Cir 1997). 
303 Without an IP address it is not possible to connect to any computer on the Internet. 
Technically the IP address could be avoided by the use of "spoofing" or by means of a proxy 
server but this is difficult and out of the reach of the usual user. The address will almost always 
provide the organisation where Internet access was achieved and the ISP will probably have a log 
that can identify the individual user and the date and time of contact. Sobel, above n 157, 
footnote 12. 
3
0-i Harbottle & Lewis Solicitors "Internet Service Providers can be Called to Identify Users" 
(1999) 4(1) Communications Law 31. 
305 Sobel provides an example of approp1iate safeguards that should be followed before 
information can be released: there should be the presentation of a subpoena; in civil cases the user 
should be informed and given a reasonable amount of time to take action (such as a move to 
quash); if the matter is taken to the court Sobel has identified various factors that should be 
considered such as specificity of notice and previous attempts to locate the defendant. Sobel, 
above n 157, paras 19 - 21. 
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Communications Privacy Act requires law enforcement agencies to obtain a judicial 
issuance of a warrant, subject to specific procedural requirements. For civil discovery, 
however, the statute is permissive and allows the provider to disclose the record.
306 
However, again the approach favoured is that provided for in the OCILLA. Under this 
Act the copyright owner can request a federal district court to issue a subpoena to an SP 
for identification of the alleged infringer. If successful the ISP must provide all 
personally identifying information in its possession.
307 
This information should be included in websites privacy policies so that users are aware 
of the potential for them to be identified. By opting in to the service the user would 
consent to this identification in appropriate circumstances. This would protect privacy 
but also provide an incentive for individuals to follow privacy laws, due to the potential 
for them to be identified and might become the subject of an action. 
VII. ENFORCEMENT: A PROPOSAL 
Regardless of whether harmonisation has occurred national legislation should be 
implemented providing for adequate privacy principles and an effective enforcement 
system. If there is a harmonised agreement this national legislation should at least 
implement the internationally agreed minimum principles. More stringent principles 
could be added by nations if they chose. For example, the government might impose a 
duty to build privacy protection features into technological designs.
308 
How should the general principles of the international agreement, and national 
legislation that implements it, be enforced? Such general principles must by necessity 
be ambiguous and it is impossible to reconcile conflicts by legislative language.
309 
Supervisory bodies must therefore carry out this reconciliation on a case by case basis. 
This allows for the flexibility that is necessary both to protect the privacy of individuals 
and to promote the growth of the Internet as an information provider and avenue for e-
comrnerce. Such an approach is appropriate as it can accommodate new technologies or 
problems that are yet to surf ace. 
306 The statute provides that a service provider "may disclose a record or other information 
pe1taining to a subscriber .. to any person other than a government entity" 18 USC 2703 
(c)(I )(A). 
307 Dmitrieva, above n 289. 
308 The recommended Canadian Charter of privacy rights includes this principle. 
309 Rigaux, in Aldhouse, above n 7, 12. 
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These principles 111 conjunction with effective enforcement give the user increased 
control over his or her information. What users need is practical and available 
protection for their informational privacy.m They need a cheap, quick and effective 
solution that can resolve the majority of claims. Any claim would first be made to the 
industry. If a satisfactory resolution is not reached in appropriate circumstances a 
privacy agency would hear the case. Finally, an appeal may be made to a tribunal or 
court. Under the classification system previously mentioned this proposal could be 
described as a passive scheme with enhanced enforcement capabilities. 
A. The Industry's Role 
While a workable solution must be adopted there is no clear cut choice between self-
regulation or government control via legislation; both are required.311 Industry 
involvement is required primarily to reduce costs. Any solution must have industry 
support or enforcement would be extremely expensive and the laws would be 
impossible to police. What must be borne in mind is the "general desirability of a free 
flow of information and the recognition of the right of government and business to 
achieve their objectives in an efficient way".312 
Any form of regulation will probably therefore emphasise industry-generated codes of 
conduct. The use of such codes has become increasingly acceptable. The Privacy 
Commissioner should issue or endorse Codes of Practice for particular groups or 
services. Allowing for the development of effective and broadly applicable codes 
would allow for flexibility, broad coverage, and industry involvement. These codes 
may be modified for specific industries to make them more or less stringent. As far as 
possible these modified codes should implement the same basic principles. In 
appropriate cases modified codes remove procedural complications and can avoid 
. .f. 1 . d 11 3 sigm icant y mcrease costs.· · Provisions could be tailored to meet existing 
conditions, this is particularly important in a highly technological and constantly 
changing industry. The use of differing codes should, however, be used sparingly to 
avoid both user and collector confusion and make compliance easier. 
310 Reilly, above n 6, para 14 7. 
3 11 Valentine, above n 68. 
m Privacy Act 1993, sl4(a). 
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Any code of practice must comply with the following principles provided by the OECD. 
A successful code of practice should: contain positive statements providing a 
commitment to data protection principles ("form"); be tailored to the industry or 
company, not merely state general principles, and attempt to apply the principles so they 
are workable ("substance"); deal with the data protection issues specifically confronting 
the relevant industry/company ("level of detail"); be written in simple readily 
comprehensible language for those in the relevant industry ("transparency"); provide for 
an implementation procedure within the industry to provide certainty, this could include 
privacy officers who are responsible for privacy issues and report to management 
("implementation"); provide for occasional review to assess relevance and make 
changes if necessary ("review"); be underpinned with a means of control or 
enforcement whether legislative, contractual or administrative - there must be a means 
of redress for data subjects or other interested parties ("control").
3 14 
The data collectors should then implement individual policies with the code as a 
baseline and default provision. This development of internal guidelines is important.
3 15 
Appropriate industry schemes could be approved by the Commissioner, such as 
TRUSTe or BBB. A breach of the approved scheme would be considered a breach of 
the relevant privacy principles. The industry should bear the cost of this approval as 
they will be receiving the benefit from such a system. These schemes should provide 
their own enforcement mechanism. The Commissioner would therefore have no direct 
role in enforcement unless the decision reached, sanction imposed, or remedy awarded 
was unfair. 
As an incentive to market compliance, other than sanctions, businesses could be 
shielded from litigation as long as they comply with the privacy code or approved 
schemes. If they could not be shielded at least it could be guaranteed that this would be 
a strong consideration in the commissioner or court's decision. Currently industry 
initiatives do not shield data collectors from liability. There is evidence to suggest that 
traditional legal precedent will override Internet customs or self-regulating practices. 
The goal of privacy protection and legislation should partly be self-regulation. The 
focus should be on Governments in partnership with business and other relevant sectors 
313 Evans, above n 169. 185. 
31~ Tucker, above n 59, 67 . 
315 Tucker. above n 59. 8 I. 
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of society to develop and implement strategies. The user should therefore generally be 
required to complain to the industry or appropriate sanctioned scheme agency concerned 
first about any action that is, or appears to be, privacy interference. 
B. The Privacy Agency 
If the individual is not satisfied with the industry provided response an effective avenue 
of complaint must be available. An external mechanism must be in place to receive 
complaints and to analyse and act upon them. This independent body can also act as a 
contact point with other jurisdictions, and cooperate in the investigation of 
complaints.3 16 The agency's decisions would be seen as more legitimate to the public 
and the presence of an independent enforcement mechanism would increase consumer 
confidence. The publication of decisions would help provide guidance for how the 
industry should be acting. 
The approach favoured is the establishment of, or use of an existing, privacy agency. 
Using institutions already in place would reduce start up costs and allow for a type of 
intervention that has already been found to be effective. One extremely viable option is 
that of the privacy co111111issioner model, which is flourishing worldwide. Canada 
created this system which has been enthusiastically adopted by many countries. For 
example, New Zealand has followed this model as have all of the EU countries that have 
the equivalent with their Data Protection Co111111issioners.
3 17 Such agencies typically 
provide a low-cost , or possibly no-cost, forum for resolution. The agency should adopt 
an investigative and non-adversarial model using mediation to resolve disputes. This 
leads to a much simpler process and speedier resolution than that provided by a court, 
and offers a less formal setting. The further disclosure of personal details of 
investigations can be avoided. These factors make an agency more accessible to the 
public.3 18 
In New Zealand, experience has shown that few people are unhappy with outcomes 
reached by the Privacy Co111111issioner. In fact many agencies are on good terms with 
the Privacy Office and cooperate with investigations. Such a situation should be the 
316 This is the view of Professor Rigaux, "La vie privee, une liberte parmi Jes autres" , paper 
presented at the 19th International Conference of Privacy and Data Protection Commissioners, 
Brussels, 17-19 September, 1997 as noted in Aldhouse, above n 7, 12. 
317 Flaherty, above n 37,223. 
318 Evans, above n 169, 171. 
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aim of the agency. As noted the support of the industry will lead to a cheaper and more 
ff · 119 e ect1ve system 
1. Procedure 
Recourse to the agency should be available if one of the provisions in the applicable 
code of practice, industry scheme, or legislation was breached and the data collector or 
sanctioned enforcement agency has not taken appropriate action. As with the current 
system in New Zealand, the agency could refuse to take action on appropriate grounds. 
That is, if the complaint was trivial, the complainant had unreasonably failed to follow a 
complaints procedure provided for in a code of practice, or where there is another 
adequate remedy, particularly that provided by the industry itself. 
If a user has complained to a company that is part of a sanctioned scheme, such as 
TRUSTe or BBB, and that enforcement agency has investigated the complaint the 
agency should not normally become involved. This is particularly so if a remedy has 
already been provided or a sanction has been imposed. In such cases the aggrieved 
party could still choose to issue his or her own proceedings in a court. 320 
If the agency believes the complaint has substance best endeavours should be used to 
ensure a settlement and a satisfactory assurance against repetition. In England the Data 
Protection Commissioner can assist or take over the case of individuals who want to 
enforce their rights against the media but only if the case has significant public 
importance.321 A similar approach could be adopted with important violations of any of 
the informational privacy principles. 
The Commissioner should also have the power to act independently of any complaint 
and the ability to inquire generally into any matter, including any law, practice, or 
procedure in the private or public sector.322 This is particularly important as Internet 
privacy beaches are not necessarily readily apparent to the individual concerned. In a 
case of group harm, with little or no individual harm, it is likely that the Privacy 
Commissioner itself will need to act on its own without a complaint. Without individual 
3 19 
Evans, above n 169, 171. 
320 
Discussion Paper No 3, above n 225. 
321 R . h b asaia . a oven 181, 185. 
322 
Privacy Commissioner A Guide to the Privacy Act 1993 - Fact Sheet No 1 (Wellington, l July 
1993). 
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harm it is unlikely that an individual will be prepared to take the time and effort to 
complain. 
The Privacy Rights Clearinghouse model could be utilised as an avenue for consumer 
complaints, particularly by those who do not wish to take the matter up on a formal 
Jevel. 323 Initially a toll free hotline was set up which fielded approximately 10,000 calls 
per year from consumers that were handled by the director of the Clearinghouse and law 
students. Due to funding cuts the service was discontinued. A website has now been 
established and e-mail is used to receive approximately three to four thousand messages 
a year. The information learned is reported to legislators, regulators, government 
officials, industry representatives and other consumer advocates.
324 If enough 
complaints are received then the agency could initiate its own investigation. This model 
would also allow for direct interaction with consumers and thereby enables the agency's 
educative function to be fulfilled. 
Another approach that could be adapted for the privacy context is that used by the 
Internet Watch Foundation. This government-supported organisation assesses the 
legality of pornography that is reported by the public via a hotline. It then notifies the 
service provider concerned and the police about any potential breaches and can 
implement takedown procedures to remove content regarded as illegal.
325 The hotline 
has been used as a model in Europe, the US and Australia.
326 However, it should be 
noted that the foundation has been criticised as it is not a public body and is neither 
accountable nor transparent.
327 
2. Remedies 
Whatever agency is used it must have real powers to be effective. If a claimant is 
harmed a remedy should be provided to that individual. As with the Directive 
compensation should be available in appropriate circumstances to cover damage and 
distress328, and for loss or unauthorised disclosure.
329 However, damages are not the 
only option. Other options include a compulsory internal administrative review or 
323 The P1ivacy Rights Clearinghouse is a Californian institute that was established in 1992. Its 
mission is to increase Californian· s awareness of how technology is affecting their lives as well as 
giving them practical information on how to safeguard their privacy. 
rn Givens. above n 9, 347. 
3
'.!
5 Barkham, above n 296. 
3'.!
6 Kerr, above n 249. 
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328 Privacy Act 1993, s22(1) (NZ). 
61 
mediation process.330 Various forms of redress should be provided including, informal 
complaint resolution, mediation, arbitration and civil Iitigation,331 periodic compliance 
audits (paid for by the wrongdoer), and neutral complaint investigation.
332 Furthermore 
the agency could impose cancellation of the right to use a certifying seal or post the 
name of the non-complier on a "bad actor" list.333 
There should not necessarily be a requirement for damage, or significant humiliation or 
injury to feelings to an individual before a sanction is imposed. Often a breach of 
informational privacy principles results in only a minimal loss to an individual but to a 
group may cause damage. Further while the breach may appear trivial at the current 
point in time in addition with other information collected it could become significant. If 
no harm to an individual claimant is caused but practices are held to breach privacy 
principles the offender should be made to implement new practices to avoid future 
breaches or made to undergo and audit. Even without harm individuals should have 
rights to correction or erasure of inaccurate data.
334 
The aim should be purely to redress damage but to deter future breaches. In appropriate 
cases, therefore, fines up to a specified maximum limit might be imposed. These fines 
should, however, be rarely used and only to punish those that blatantly disregard users' 
privacy. A pragmatic approach must be adopted that relates to the harm caused to an 
individual or a group. 
3. Funding 
Funding could pose a significant obstacle to the effective implementation of the scheme. 
Without adequate funding the system will not succeed. In New Zealand there are 
already long delays resolving privacy claims due to "substantial under-resourcing". 
This reduces the accessibility of the agency and undermines the whole system. 
335 
This 
problem would be exacerbated if Internet complaints were added to the agency's ambit 
without the provision of extra funding. 
319 Privacy Act 1993, s13 (NZ). 
330 Valentine, above n 68, 407. 
331 These are the measures advocated by the Privacy Working Group, noted in Belgum, above n 10 
, nllS-117. 
332 Valentine, above n 68 , 407. 
m These are the measures advocated by the Privacy Working Group, noted in Belgum, above 
nlO, nllS-117. 
rn Privacy Act 1993, s 24 (NZ). 
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Currently the Privacy Commissioner model is stat
e-funded. As many of the Internet 
privacy violations are caused by the private sector i
t makes sense that the cost should to 
some extent be borne by that sector. Non-complie
rs should pay the cost of assessing 
their non-compliance. It is reasonable to impose co
sts on those agencies that cause the 
harm and, more often than not, profit from the violat
ions. 
Private sector funding might, however, taint the ind
ependence of the Commission. The 
fear is that this could provide an incentive to the ag
ency to allow claims and find a data 
collector to have breached the principles. However,
 if the only benefit is that the cost of 
the assessment is recouped then the Commission w
ill not profit from bringing charges. 
Further, there is a right of appeal to a tribunal or 
court who could overturn an unfair 
ruling. 
Furthermore there is currently no suggestion that 
the income source has dictated the 
outcome of the complaints process With governmen
t funding there was the fear that the 
government could control outcomes by, for exam
ple, not bringing charges against 
government departments. This fear turned out to be
 unfounded. 
336 
As noted the emphasis placed on self-regulatory 
initiatives and industry resolution 
should reduce costs. If a collector has made all re
asonable efforts to resolve the case 
this should be a major factor in determining wheth
er the claimant has a viable claim. 
The parties should be encouraged to work out a r
esult amongst themselves, with the 
threat of sanctions as an incentive. 
The Commission· s effectiveness would be enhanced
 if, as in Canada, it could undertake 
audits on reasonable notice if the Commissioner ha
s reasonable grounds to believe the 
organisation is contravening a provision or not follo
wing a recommendation.
337 In New 
Zealand the Commissioner also has the power to au
dit agencies, but has not done so due 
to the cost. Without significant funding the Com
missioner could only carry out his 
function if the agencies had to bear the cost themselves. 
Either mandatory audits could be implemented,
 paid for by the organisation, or 
sufficient incentives must be in place for the vol
untary undertaking of such audits. 
335 Evans, above n 169. 
336 Evans, above n 169, 186. 
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Incentives such as priority for government assignments and increased public confidence, 
particularly if accompanied by a publicity drive, might lead to some companies agreeing 
to audits. These incentives could also be used to entice companies to join sanctioned 
industry schemes. Those that pass an audit, or those that are part of a sanctioned 
scheme, could be given the Privacy Commissioner·s own "seal of approval". A seal 
issued by the Privacy agency would provide clear and certain assistance to users. 
4. Educational role 
Apart from the establishment of a complaints procedure consumer education is 
necessary. This function would largely fall on the shoulders of the agency. Website 
privacy policies are inadequate information providers as they are often hard to locate 
and to understand. Most users are unaware of the potential privacy impacts of the 
relinquishment of their information, what information is being collected, what it may be 
used for and what rights they have. Education allows for informed decisions about, for 
example, what information to release and what sites to visit. If customers learnt to 
enhance their own privacy this would be the cheapest and most efficient form of 
protection. 
The Commissioner should embark on an educational campaign, via such means as 
websites, television and radio advertising, and pamphlets. Information should be 
provided on users' legal rights, means of redress and the best means of protecting 
themselves from privacy breaches. This would include information about technologies 
that can safeguard users· privacy, such as encryption and anonymisers,
338 because it will 
still be hard to practically enforce data protection legislation.
339 Potentially a list of 
those who fail to comply with privacy rules could be published. These measures should 
spurn self-regulation as customers become more aware of the privacy risks. The 
Commissioner should also work to educate data collectors to prevent future damage and 
improve practices. 
Ideally the agency would also identify areas where there is a major potential for privacy 
breaches and suggest solutions. It would take a proactive role by looking at the privacy 
.. In hl· 140 mterests 111 new ternet tee no og1es. 
338 Givens, above n 9, 355. 
339 Noeding, above n 32, 91. 
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C. The Courts 
Finally the applicant or data collector should be able to apply to another tribunal or to a 
court for a hearing, which should be able to award damages, order con-ection of the 
offender· s practices or overturn a decision of the agency. 34 1 Again for serious breaches 
fines might be imposed, which might then be used to fund the system. 
In New Zealand the principles are generally not directly enforceable in court.342 The 
courts should be freed to explicitly recognise privacy rights and enforce the principles 
adequately. This is necessary to try and address the lack of a strong history of privacy 
litigation success that is apparent in New Zealand, Australia, Canada, England and 
America.3-u 
In England at any time prior to the time when the defence is served a publisher (ISP) 
can make a written offer to the claimant and resolve the matter outside of the courts. 
This is attractive for both parties as if the offer is accepted it would provide speedy 
resolution and involve fewer costs. 3M 
The problems involved in court resolution explained above must be borne in mind. 
Therefore ideally most complaints should be resolved via the internal mechanisms or 
the agency. Previous measures of attempted resolution by both parties should be an 
integral part in determining appropriate remedies. There must be measures in place to 
ensure that trivial litigation is discouraged. 
D. The Government: a special case? 
These data protection initiatives must apply to both the private and the public sector to 
be effective345 as both hold large amounts of personal information. Perhaps no 
boundary should be recognised in the flow of information between the two so that 
140 This is one of the roles adopted by the P1ivacy Conunissioner in the Canadian system. 
Flaherty, above n 37, 228. 
341 Power, above n 8, 241. 
342 Evans, above n 169, 197. 
343 Flaherty, above n 37, 221. 
, +1 Melville-Brown, above n 291. 
345 
As in the OECD guidelines New Zealand makes no such distinction. Canada's Bill C-6 would 
protect information in the private sector and require compliance with a wide range of fair 
information practices already applicable to the public sector. 
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loopholes and demarcation disputes do not arise. 346 The public-private distinction can 
be highly artificial, particularly with "privatisation, contracting out and outsourcing of 
formerly government functions. In information terms, no boundary is recognised in the 
flow of data between the public and private sectors".
347 However, different 
considerations may arise that might warrant the development of different codes. 
The Government itself, or through private companies, might obtain information off the 
Internet. It might also place personal information onto the Internet, or sell it to third 
companies who will. The Government's collection and use of information is, however, 
different to that of the private sector as often individuals have no choice but to disclose 
their personal data. After collection the information subject normally lacks the authority 
to prevent the government from disclosing such information. Even information 
disclosed for express and legitimate purposes might be resold or used for secondary and 
unapproved purposes, such as data matching. However, unlike private industry the 
government has "legitimate interests for engaging in non-consensual uses of personal 
data that outweigh the privacy interests of individuals whose personal data might be 
shared". Privacy interests of individuals must often give way to the wider goals of 
public administration.348 This however, might be partially addressed via specific 
"information matching" programmes.34
9 Furthermore specific Public Register Privacy 
Principles could also be enacted.
350 
Another important consideration is that maximum access to government information is 
regarded as a fundamental right and delay or denial of access has been seen as 
censorship 351 and might be contrary to Official Information Acts. Freely available 
information can be seen as providing constitutional safeguards by allowing individuals 
to determine how decisions were made and giving the opportunity to challenge the 
validity of those decisions. 352 It is arguable that all non-exempt records should be 
posted on the Internet, provided that sufficient procedural safeguards are put in place to 
make sure the information is current and accurate. 
346 Privacy Commission Compliance and Administration Costs - Discussion Paper No 1 
(Auckland. 1997). 
347 Discussion Paper No 9. above n 346. 9. 
348 Thumma and Jackson, above n .. 
349 These programs are allowed in NZ under the Privacy Act 1993. Privacy Commissioner The 
Privacy Commissioner- Fact Sheet No 2 (Auckland, J July 1993). 
350 Th~se are also provided for in the NZ P1ivacy Act J 993 . Fact Sheet no 1, above n 322. 
35 1 Paul McMasters "Censorship at the Source: the worst kind" The Freedom Forum Online, 5 
February 2000 at <http://www.freedomforum.org/news/2000/05/2000-050-2-06.asp>. 
352 Evans, above n 169, 24. 
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For these reasons explicit guidelines are required as to the way data may be shared 
amongst government agencies or the situations in which it may be released to the public 
via the Internet or onsold to companies who may do the same. 353 
353 Thumma and Jackson, above n 158. 
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VIII. CONCLUSION 
If some degree of certainty about data information principles can be provided data 
subjects and data providers will be able to ascertain their opportunities and their 
responsibilities in regards to the use of information. However whatever system is in 
place it must be flexible enough to adapt to the ever-changing Internet environment. By 
2004 it has been predicted that the Internet will be a "Wireless World" with a majority 
of Internet participants accessing the Internet via mobile terrninals.
354
. There is no point 
implementing a system that will be obsolete within a short span of time. Using broad 
principles on an international and national level allows legislation to weather the storm 
of technological change. The codes advocated provide the flexibility and the focus 
required to deal with this rapidly changing environment. 
It will inevitably be argued that this system will pose a threat to freedom of expression. 
It is not doubted that the Internet has the ability to enhance freedom of speech. 
However, the American view that freedom of expression and privacy inherently conflict 
is incorrect. If there are adequate protections available for the privacy of individuals 
they will be more likely to freely express their ideas. Conversely the more individuals 
lack the ability to control their information the less likely they are to impart 
information.355 Lack of privacy protection will lead to caution and self-censorship.
356 
It 
is accepted that their are limits to privacy, not only to the extent that an individual puts 
him or herself into the public arena but also, for such activities as law enforcement, 
media, national security or freedom of information requests, or on public interest 
grounds.357 These exceptions would have to be part of any privacy code or protection. 
The threat to civil liberties and e-commerce is that "if governments do not find 
workable ways of policing the Internet by reasonable and cooperative means and they 
fall back on the more traditional and oppressive authoritarian styles of regulation".
358 
An example of the danger of strict Jaws was provided in Britain where lawyers have 
35-1 The ARC Group "Wireless Internet: applications, technology and player strategy" ( 1999) at 
<http://www. the-arc-group. com/reports/wireless<uscore> i nternet/toc<uscore. wi/htm>. 
355 Aldhouse, above n 7, 11. 
356 Belgum, above n 10. 
357 This is noted in Strasbourg jurisprudence, see Andrew Drzemczewski "The right to respect for 
private and family life, home and c01respondence" Human Rights Fils No 7, Council of Europe, 
Strasbourg, 1984. 
358 Kerr, above n 249. 
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used the threat of prosecution359 to remove websites from servers. Such a heavy-handed 
approach must be avoided, what is required is workable co-regulation
360 
backed up by 
legislative sanctions. 
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159 Under Britain· s 1996 Defamation Act and stringent libel laws. 
360 This is the view of David Kerr. chief executive of the Internet Watch Foundation. In Bark.ham, 
above n 296. 
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